Impeaching Precedent
Charles L. Barzunt
This Article is about the nature and scope of legal argument. It considers the
question of whether a court, when determining the precedentialweight of one of its
prior decisions, should consider historical evidence indicating that the decision
was decided on the basis of improper motivations or as the result of political pressure. In a common law system in which courts pervasively rely on precedents as a
source of law, that question is of obvious practicaland theoretical importance. Yet
courts and scholars have hardly even raised the question, let alone provided a satisfactory answer to it. Instead, they have assumed that such explanations are historical,not legal arguments-thekind of thing appropriatefor law reviews, but not
for courts of law.
This Article directly challenges that assumption. Drawing on a few rare examples when justices of the Supreme Court, or lawyers arguing before them, have
sought to undermine court precedents by showing them to have been based on "extralegal"considerations,I argue that such efforts to historicize or-to use the term
I prefer-impeach past decisions are a legitimate and potentially useful means of
evaluatinga decision'sprecedential weight. Although various policy justifications
may support excluding such arguments from judicial debate, I consider several
such objections and explain why none is particularlypersuasive. If the argument
presented is sound, then not only should courts be more receptive to impeaching
arguments, but-at least in the realm of constitutional law--both courts and
scholars should perhaps broaden their understandingof how constitutionalhistory bears on constitutionaltheory.
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INTRODUCTION

When deciding whether to follow one of its precedents,
should a court consider historical evidence indicating that the
precedent was decided on the basis of improper motivations or
as the result of political pressure? The question seems so obvious
that one would think that there must be an equally obvious answer to it. But not only is there no consensus answer to it, the
question has hardly been asked. This is astonishing. Despite the
fact that judicial decisions remain a pervasive source of law in
the American legal system, and despite the fact that efforts to
historicize court precedents fill volumes of law reviews, neither
courts nor legal scholars have devoted any serious attention to
asking whether, and if so when, a past court's actual motivations might properly bear on the precedential status of its decision. The purpose of this Article is to raise that question and offer an answer to it.
Before laying out my own analysis, however, a few examples
may help to clarify the issue. Consider first the news reports following the Supreme Court's recent decision in National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius' that Chief Justice John

Roberts may have switched his vote to uphold the Patient
1

132 S Ct 2566 (2012).
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Protection and Affordable Care Act2 largely for political or institutional reasons.3 Professor Randy Barnett, who worked on the
case on behalf of those challenging the law, commented to the
press that such a fact, if true, "reduces [the decision's] value as a
precedent." Of course, that comment was likely made in Professor Barnett's capacity as a lawyer representing the losing party,
but that is precisely the point. For it prompts the following questions: Would Professor Barnett make that argument in a brief to
the Court in a future case in which the scope of Congress's power under the Taxing and Spending Clause was at issue? Should
he make the argument?
In one sense, the answer to both questions is likely no, and
the reason is obvious: lawyers typically make arguments they
think courts will find persuasive, and accusing the Court (or one
of its members) of ignoring the law for the sake of political expedience is a risky strategy indeed. More importantly, though,
such an argument hardly seems to be a legal argument at all.
Sure, constitutional-law professors may tell their students about
Chief Justice Roberts's reported shift as part of the explanation
of the decision, but when they do they will likely not claim that
those facts, if true, bear on the decision's legal justification. As
one recent commentator put it in a related context, such a professor "would not [ ] be indoctrinating her students in the norms
of professional legal practice; she would not be 'doing' constitutional law."6 Lawyers, after all, advance arguments about the legal grounds (or lack thereof) of past decisions, not about their
historical causes.
Recently, however, a group of lawyers and historians made
an argument to the Supreme Court of exactly that sort. In
Hamdan v Rumsfeld,6 an amicus brief submitted by a group of
legal scholars and historians sought to persuade the Court that
its 1942 decision in Ex parte Quirin,7 in which the Court had
upheld the President's use of a military commission to try and
Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
See, for example, Jennifer Haberkorn and Darren Samuelsohn, Roberts' Health
Care Switch: Gasoline on the Fire, Politico (July 2, 2012), online at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78075.html#ixzzlzWOvWkp5 (visited Nov 19,
2013).
2

3

4

5

Id.

Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv L Rev 379, 381 (2011). Professor Greene
is here referring more specifically to cases in the so-called anticanon, but his point applies more broadly to the use of nondoctrinal history to explain past decisions.
6
548 US 557 (2006).
7
317 US 1 (1942).
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sentence to death seven German saboteurs,8 was a "poisoned"
precedent because it was infected by judicial bias, conflict of interest, and inordinate pressure from President Franklin Roosevelt.9 In so arguing, the amici cited various historical materials,
including the Justices' private papers, to show such bias, conflicts, and pressure. 0
Still, when it came to justifying the legal relevance of their
historical evidence to the Court's stare decisis inquiry, the amici
had little to work with. Although the Court has said that its policy of stare decisis can be overcome for various reasons, none of
those reasons quite fit the amici's argument about Quirin.11 Af-

ter all, the thrust of their argument was not that the Quirin
Court's constitutional analysis was poor (though they argued
that, too), nor was it that circumstances since Quirin had
changed. Instead, their claim was that the historical evidence
revealed the case to have been "poisoned" or "discredit[ed]" or, to
use the term I will invoke, impeached.12 With no doctrinal footing to support their argument, amici failed to persuade even
those Justices who were critical of Quirin to repudiate that decision entirely.'3
Again, it may seem unsurprising that the Justices declined
the invitation to attack the good faith of their past brethren on
8 Id at 20-24, 48.
9 Brief of Legal Scholars and Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
[Effect of Quirin], Hamdan v Rumsfeld, No 05-184, *6-18 (filed Jan 6, 2006) (available
on Westlaw at 2006 WL 53973) ("Legal Scholars Brief'). The brief lists its authors as
Professor Michal R. Belknap, Professor David J. Danelski, Professor Peter Irons, and
Pierce O'Donnell.
10 See id at *11 (observing that "several private communications from the Roosevelt
Administration to the Justices reveal that the President expected-indeed, demandedunanimous approval of the exercise of his war powers").
11 The cases amici cited in their brief held that the following circumstances would
justify the Court in treating one of its own past decisions as nonbinding: where the decision was wrongly decided; where it has caused harm to the legal system; where it is
deemed to be "inconsistent with the sense of justice"; where the "facts have so changed,
or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application
or justification." See id at *7, citing Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia
concurring), Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 174 (1989), Planned
Parenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 855 (1992).
12 Legal Scholars Brief at *15, 18.
13 For instance, in his dissent in Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004), Justice Antonin Scalia had observed that Quirin was "not this Court's finest hour," id at 569 (Scalia
dissenting), but in Hamdan Scalia did not deny Quirin's authority completely, as amici
had encouraged the Court to do. Instead, he distinguished it on the ground that it predated the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub L No 109-148, 119 Stat 2739, which offered the petitioner "an avenue for the consideration of petitioner's claims that did not
exist at the time of Quirin." Hamdan, 548 US at 677.
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the Court. But in fact, occasionally they have done just that.
Consider two more examples. First, in Mitchell v Helms,14 Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the Court, made use of historical evidence to suggest that the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence had been infected by anti-Catholic bigotry.1> Specifically, the Court held that whether a school is deemed to be
"pervasively sectarian" was not properly a factor in determining
whether the Constitution barred the government from offering
aid to the school in part because the "pervasively sectarian" language, first used in the 1973 decision Hunt v McNair,16 had a
"shameful pedigree" and was originally associated with "hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general."17 As a
pair of commentators observed soon after the decision, Justice
Thomas's analysis may well have been accurate as a historical
matter, but it is "not the usual stuff of Supreme Court debate."18
Indeed it is not. 9 But nor was Justice Thomas's style of argument unprecedented. Four years prior to Mitchell, Justice David Souter, writing in dissent, employed a similar strategy to
undermine another of the Court's precedents. In Seminole Tribe
of Florida v Florida,20 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Congress from authorizing federal courts to take
jurisdiction over cases in which a state was sued by one of its
own citizens.21 In so holding, Chief Justice William Rehnquist's

opinion relied heavily on the 1890 case of Hans v Louisiana,22
which had first interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to apply to
suits brought by a state's own citizens.23 In his dissent, Justice

Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
530 US 793 (2000).
See id at 828-29.
16 413 US 734 (1973).
17 Mitchell, 530 US at 828-29, citing Hunt, 413 US at 743.
18 John C. Jeffries Jr and James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 Mich L Rev 279, 280 (2001) (observing that "[t]he constitutional disfavor of
'pervasively sectarian' institutions is indeed a doctrine born, if not of bigotry, at least of a
highly partisan understanding of laws 'respecting an establishment of religion').
19 Rather, at first blush, such an argument seems to be what Professor Jack Balkin
calls "off-the-wall." See generally Jack M. Balkin, 'Wrong the Day It Was Decided":
Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 BU L Rev 677 (2005) (distinguishing be.
tween "off-the-wall" and "on-the-wall" arguments). That is, it stands outside the existing
conventions that determine what are and what are not reasonable and appropriate forms
of constitutional interpretation.
20 517 US 44 (1996).
21 See id at 76.
22 134 US 1 (1890).
23 See Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 54-55, 64-65, 68-69.
14

15
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Breyer, took dead aim. on Hans, arguing that the decision lacked
authority as precedent because it had been decided largely for
political and institutional reasons. Citing law review articles, he
argued that the Hans Court knew that it could not enforce its
judgments after federal troops had withdrawn from the South as
part of the Compromise of 1877.24 By refusing jurisdiction over
the suit, the Hans Court was thus able to pay lip service to the
plaintiff bondholder's right to be reimbursed by the state of Louisiana without the Court having to suffer the embarrassment
that would arise if it could not enforce its remedy.25 "So it is,"
Justice Souter concluded, "that history explains, but does not
honor, Hans."26
Justice Souter's Seminole Tribe dissent nicely illustrates the
precarious status of such historicizing arguments in contemporary legal culture, both because he developed it in such a detailed way and because it provoked such a fierce response from
the majority. Chief Justice Rehnquist decried the dissent's effort
to undermine Hans as an "undocumented and highly speculative
extralegal explanation of the decision in Hans," which did a "disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication."27 In
other words, even if such "extralegal explanations" are commonplace in law reviews, they are out of bounds in judicial argument.28
Yet the question remains: Is the exclusion of such arguments from judicial debate justified? If so, why? If not, why not?
Answering such questions is not only necessary in order to evaluate properly arguments like those made by the Hamdan amici;
it is also vital to understanding the nature and scope of legal argument itself. Yet despite the vast literature on the role of history
24
See id at 120-21 & n 16 (Souter dissenting). The commentators the dissent relied
on most were John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum L Rev 1889, 1974, 1978-82, 2000, 2002 (1983); John V.
Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh Amendment in American
History 53-57 (Oxford 1987); and Eric Foner, Reconstruction:America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877 575-87 (Harper 1988).
25 See Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 121 (Souter dissenting); Hans, 134 US
at 20.
26 Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 122 (Souter dissenting).
27 Id at 68-69.
28 Each of the historical arguments surveyed above has been made by legal scholars
about the cases in question. See, for example, Jeffries and Ryan, 100 Mich L Rev at 27980 (cited in note 18); Michal R. Belknap, Alarm Bells from the Past: The TroublingHistory of American Military Commissions, 28 J S Ct Hist 300, 307 (2003); Edward A. Purcell
Jr, The ParticularlyDubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History,
and "FederalCourts",81 NC L Rev 1927, 2057 (2003).
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in shaping constitutional adjudication, neither historians nor
constitutional theorists seem to have carefully considered the
question of whether such historical explanations could play a legitimate role in doctrinal analysis, constitutional or otherwise.29
One reason for this may be that investigating the question is as
much a jurisprudential inquiry as it is a traditionally legal or
historical one. Pursuing it thus requires breaking down the
boundaries that sometimes divide various subdisciplines of law,
including historical, doctrinal, and philosophical scholarship.
Whatever the reason for such neglect, the goal of this Article
is to put an end to it. It does so by challenging directly the deeply felt intuition-expressed well by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Seminole Tribe-that arguments which offer "extralegal" explanations of previous court decisions have no proper role to play in
judicial argument. My claim, in short, is that the effort to historicize or impeach a past decision is a legitimate and potentially useful means of evaluating a decision's authority as a matter
of precedent. True, various practical and policy concerns might
be offered to justify excluding such arguments from courtroom

29 On the historical side, see William J. Novak, Constitutional Theology: The Revival of Whig History in American Public Law, 2010 Mich St L Rev 623, 624-25. Novak provides a helpful collection of sources examining the role of history in constitutional jurisprudence, including, among others, Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations
(Belknap 1991); Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution:A Biography (Random House
2005); and Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: PopularConstitutionalismand Judicial Review (Oxford 2004). For other historical explanations of Court precedent, see
generally Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford 2004); Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the
Colorblind Constitution, 94 Cornell L Rev 203 (2008). For good examples of historical
debates about the role political pressure has played in the Court's constitutional decisions, see generally Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a
ConstitutionalRevolution (Oxford 1998); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court
Reborn: The ConstitutionalRevolution in the Age of Roosevelt (Oxford 1995); G. Edward
White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal: The Internalist/ExternalistDebate, 110
Am Hist Rev 1094 (2005); Laura Kalman, Law, Politics and the New Deal(s), 108 Yale L
J 2165 (1999). As for constitutional theorists, see, for example, Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 9 (Oxford 1982) (comparing various types of constitutional argument including, among others, "textual argument," "doctrinal argument,"
"prudential argument," and "historical argument," but defining the last category as that
kind of argument concerned with determining "the original understanding of the constitutional provision to be construed"); Richard H. Fallon Jr, A Constructivist Coherence
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv L Rev 1189, 1194-1209 (1987) (discussing various forms of constitutional argument, including those based on the plain
meaning of the constitutional text, those based on the framers' intent, and those based
on judicial precedent, but not including any mention of the kind of historicizing or impeaching argument discussed here).
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debate, but I consider several such objections and show why
none is particularly persuasive.
My argument proceeds in four parts. Part I distinguishes
arguments that attempt to historicize court precedents in the
way described above from other, less controversial uses of history to interpret previous decisions, which differ in subtle but important ways. Since I refer to the arguments with which I am
concerned as "impeaching" arguments due to their structural
similarity to the arguments lawyers make at trial when seeking
to impeach witnesses, I defend and explain the analogy to witness impeachment in this Part. Still, for reasons explained below, my core argument in no way depends on the impeaching
analogy.
Part II then lays the jurisprudential groundwork for the rest
of the Article. Doing so requires engaging in some fairly technical philosophical analysis of the nature of, and justification
for, precedent. Specifically, I show that the relevance of impeaching arguments to a court's analysis of precedent depends
on (1) which rationales underlie the precedential practice in
question and on (2) whether that practice authorizes courts to
make their own judgments as to the authoritative weight past
decisions deserve.
Part III then makes the core claim of the paper. It applies
the jurisprudential analysis of Part II to various contexts in
which courts treat past decisions as authoritative: the practice of
lower courts obeying the decisions of superior courts (so-called
"vertical precedent"), the common law practice of treating a
court's own past decisions as binding (stare decisis or "horizontal
precedent"), and finally, the role of stare decisis in the context of
constitutional adjudication. I argue that under the most plausible rationales for, and models of, precedent considered in Part II,
impeaching arguments are indeed relevant to a court's precedential analysis at common law and in the constitutional context
as well.
Part IV then responds to various practical and policy objections to using impeaching arguments in doctrinal analysis. I argue that such objections, though powerful, are not as persuasive
as they first appear. Finally, in a short conclusion, I suggest
some broader implications my argument may have for the relationship between constitutional history and theory more generally.
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I. HISTORY, PRECEDENT, AND IMPEACHING EVIDENCE
Before considering the role that impeaching arguments
might play in a court's analysis of precedent, it will be helpful to
clarify the structure of such arguments and to illustrate why
they entail a distinctive type of reasoning. This Part does just
that, first by distinguishing impeaching arguments from three
other, less controversial uses of history and then by analogizing
them to the kinds of arguments lawyers make when crossexamining witnesses at trial. Most of the examples below are
drawn from the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence,
but the points made are generalizable to other courts and other
doctrinal areas.
A. Using History to Interpret the Meaning of a Past Decision
One relatively uncontroversial use of historical evidence involves using it to interpret the meaning of a past decision regarded as good law. When the historical evidence relied on is a
traditional legal source, such as a previous court's written opinion, this use is paradigmatic of conventional legal analysis. But
it is not unheard of for a court to look to other historical sources
to help discern a decision's meaning.
Consider, for instance, the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District No. 1.30 There, the Court considered the constitutionality of
two school districts' plans to maintain racial diversity in public
schools by assigning students to schools based partly on their
race. In concluding that the Equal Protection Clause barred the
plans under review, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court,
quoted transcripts of the oral argument in Brown v Board of
Education of Topekas' to show that the plaintiffs' counsel in that
landmark decision had insisted that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibited the government from using race as a factor in providing educational benefits.32 "[H]istory will be heard," the Court
proclaimed, and what history said, according to the Court, was
that Brown stood for a colorblind principle that barred public
school districts from using race when assigning students to
schools, even for the purpose of maintaining racial diversity.3
30
31
32
33

551 US 701 (2007).

347 US 483 (1954).
ParentsInvolved in Community Schools, 551 US at 747.
Id at 746-48.
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Using history to interpret the meaning of a precedent may
be controversial in certain instances and for particular reasons.
For instance, the transcripts from oral argument that the Parents Involved Court relied on may not be a very reliable indicator of what the Brown Justices thought about colorblindness.34
One might even object to using a more reliable source, such as a
judge or justice's internal memos and notes, either on the
ground that what a court is properly interested in is the public
meaning of past decisions, not the subjective intent of the person
who decided it,35 or because doing so might create perverse incentives for future judges and justices.36 At least in part for
these reasons, the widespread practice of courts is to exclude
such evidence when interpreting precedents.37
But these objections, which mirror those made against the
use of legislative history for the purpose of statutory interpretation,38 only bear on a particular type of historical evidence used,
rather than the use of history as such. So, for instance, if one
were concerned with understanding the public meaning of the
Brown holding, then presumably newspaper articles showing
how it was understood at the time would also be relevant and
not subject to the same concerns.
In any case, this use of history is clearly distinguishable
from the impeaching arguments considered above. In his Seminole Tribe dissent, for instance, Justice Souter was not suggesting that the Hans Court really meant to authorize federal court
jurisdiction over suits brought against states by their own citizens even though the language of the opinion suggests the opposite conclusion. Rather, he was using the historical evidence as
part of an argument for not treating Hans as precedent at all.

34 See Schmidt, 94 Cornell L Rev at 215-16 (cited in note 29) (criticizing the Court
for relying seemingly exclusively on these historical materials in interpreting the Brown
decision).
35
See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The PoliticalSeduction of the Law
144 (Free Press 1990) (emphasizing the importance of a comparable distinction in the
context of determining the original understanding of constitutional provisions).
36
See Adrian Vermeule, JudicialHistory, 108 Yale L J 1311, 1339 (1999).
37 See id at 1313 ("Federal courts do not consider the judiciary's internal records as
interpretive sources bearing on the meaning of published opinions or judiciallypromulgated rules.") (citation omitted).
38 Indeed, Professor Adrian Vermeule has drawn the analogy between such "judicial history" and legislative history in order to show that many of the arguments that
support excluding the former seem to apply with equal force to the latter. See id at 1315
("[Tihe judicial history puzzle may tell us something, perhaps a good deal, about the
more familiar debates over legislative history and similar materials.").
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Similarly, Justice Thomas was not offering a particular gloss on
the "pervasively sectarian"39 language of Hunt on the ground
that doing so better captures that Court's meaning; instead, he
was giving grounds for discarding the doctrine entirely because
it had been based in religious animus.
Using History to Show Changed Circumstances

B.

It is also relatively uncontroversial for courts to use history
to show that factual circumstances-whether social, legal, economic, or political-have sufficiently changed to justify abandoning a past decision's doctrinal approach. In the 1997 antitrust
case State Oil Co v Khan,40 for instance, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of stare decisis, but observed that when
interpreting the Sherman Act, where the Court acts much like a
common law court, "there is a competing interest, well represented in this Court's decisions, in recognizing and adapting to
changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience."41 The Court thus overruled its previous decision in Albrecht v Herald Co,42 which had held that vertical maximum
price fixing was per se unlawful, instead holding that such price
fixing should be evaluated under the rule of reason. 43 Since Albrecht, the Court explained, it had yet to confront "an unadulterated vertical, maximum-price-fixing arrangement."44
In the constitutional context, the Supreme Court has engaged in similar reasoning, though sometimes the relevance of
changed circumstances is explicitly incorporated into substantive constitutional doctrine rather than functioning as an implicit exception to the doctrine of stare decisis. In Roper v Simmons,45 for example, the Court overruled its previous decision in
Stanford v Kentucky,46 which had held that the Eighth Amendment did not bar states from executing defendants who had been
sixteen years old at the time they committed murder.47 It did so
on the ground that interpreting the Eighth Amendment required
39

Hunt, 413 US at 743.

40

522 US 3 (1997).

41

Id at 20.

42
43

44

(1990)
45
46

47

390 US 145 (1968).
See State Oil, 522 US at 22.
Id, quoting Atlantic Richfield Co v USA Petroleum Co, 495 US 328, 336 n 6
(quotation marks omitted).
543 US 551 (2005).
492 US 361 (1989).
Simmons, 543 US at 555-56, 574.
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looking to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," and concluding that those standards had evolved substantially in the nearly sixteen years since
Stanford had been decided.48
The changed-circumstances justification for overruling a
past decision is relatively uncontroversial, but it is quite different from the kind of arguments considered in the Introduction.
Justice Souter was not arguing that Hans was at one point justifiable but that events had proven its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to be unworkable. Justice Thomas was not
reasoning that considering whether a school was "pervasively
sectarian"4@ was at one point properly relevant to determining
Establishment Clause violations but that such a consideration
had outgrown its utility.5o Nor were the Hamdan amici suggesting that circumstances had changed since Quirin, thereby rendering it an anachronism. Instead, each of these arguments suggested that the decision under analysis was defective the
moment it was decided.
C. Using History to Contradict an Assumption of a Past
Decision
Closely related to, but conceptually distinct from, the application of history just discussed is one that uses it to contradict a
proposition on which a past court's holding rests.5 1 An example
of this use of history is the Supreme Court's decision in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey.52 There the

Court considered whether the Due Process Clause rendered unconstitutional various provisions of a Pennsylvania statute regulating abortions.53 In upholding the constitutional right to an
abortion that the Court had announced in Roe v Wade,54 the
Court's joint opinion distinguished Roe from other cases of a
48 Id at 560-61, quoting Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 100-01 (1958) (quotation marks
omitted). See also Simmons, 543 US at 564-68.
49 Hunt, 413 US at 743.
50 Mitchell, 530 US at 828-29.
51 So closely related, in fact, that the Supreme Court lumps them together into one
factor in its stare decisis analysis. See Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania
v Casey, 505 US 833, 855 (1992) (listing as one of the factors that could outweigh the policy of stare decisis "whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as
to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification").
52
505 US 833 (1992).
53 Id at 846-53.
54 410 US 113 (1973).
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"comparable dimension," which had been subsequently overruled.65 It explained that the Court had been justified in overruling Plessy v Fergusone and Lochner v New Yorks7 (in Brown and
West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish,58respectively) on the ground that

history revealed those decisions to have been premised on "false
factual assumptions."59 In particular, Lochner had been based on
a false assumption "about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare,"60 whereas the Plessy Court had wrongly assumed that legally enforced
racial segregation did not inherently stigmatize African Americans with a "badge of inferiority."61 The Court thus distinguished
Roe on the ground that history had not revealed it to have been
based on analogously false premises.62

Another example of this use of history is the recent Fourth
Amendment case, Arizona v Gant.63 There the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment bars police officers from searching the
inside of a recent arrestee's car unless the officer has a reasonable belief either that the arrestee can regain access to the car or
that inside it there is evidence justifying the arrest. 64 In so holding, the Court disclaimed adherence to what it characterized as
a "broad reading" of New York v Belton,65 according to which police officers were permitted to search the inside of an arrestee's
vehicle irrespective of whether the arrestee could possibly
reenter the vehicle and destroy any possible evidence.66 The
Court justified its treatment of Belton by reasoning that "[t]he
experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton has shown
that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that
decision is unfounded. We now know that articles inside the
passenger compartment are rarely 'within the area into which
an arrestee might reach."'67

55

Casey, 505 US at 861-64.

56

163 US 537 (1896).

57

198 US 45 (1905).

58 300 US 379 (1937).
59 Casey, 505 US at 861-63.
60 Id at 862.
61 Id at 863, citing Brown, 347 US at 494-95 (quotation marks omitted).
62
63
64

Casey, 505 US at 864.
129 S Ct 1710 (2009).

Id at 1714.
453 US 454 (1981).
66 Gant, 129 S Ct at 1719.
67 Id at 1723 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Belton, 453 US at 460.
65
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It is possible to interpret one of the arguments I've cited as
an example of an impeaching argument as really an argument
about false factual assumptions. Specifically, Justice Souter's
argument about Hans could be construed in this way. The interpretation would go like this: The Hans Court considered the capacity of federal courts to enforce their judgments to be a valid
and relevant factor in interpreting the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment. It also assumed, as a factual matter, that federal
courts did not possess the power to enforce judgments brought
against a state by one of its own citizens and so held that the
Eleventh Amendment barred federal court jurisdiction over such
suits. But that factual assumption was subsequently proven to
be false, which undermines the Hans decision's authority
as precedent. Indeed, there is some textual support for this
interpretation.68

Nevertheless, this is not a plausible interpretation of what
Justice Souter was trying to do. Nowhere did he argue that the
Hans Court was mistaken in thinking that it would not have

been able to enforce a judgment against the state of Louisiana.
Rather, Justice Souter suggested that the history he discussed
"explains, but does not honor" the Hans decision.69 Lest there be
any doubt as to why the explanation he offered does not "honor"
Hans, the article from which Justice Souter drew most heavily
in making his historical argument makes it clear: "By couching
its opinion in the abstractions of high jurisprudence and legal

68 Supporting this interpretation are two salient facts. First, the Hans Court did
itself mention in its opinion the difficulty of enforcing the judgment against the state.
See Hans, 134 US at 13. Second, Justice Souter arguably tried to characterize his own
argument this way, insisting that his historical explanation of Hans was analogous to
the Court's recent treatment of Kentucky v Dennison, 65 US (24 How) 66 (1860), in Puerto Rico v Branstad, 483 US 219 (1987). See Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 122 n
17. In Dennison, decided in 1860, the Court had held that federal courts had no power to
compel a state officer to fulfill his duty under the Extradition Clause to deliver a fugitive
back to a state from which he had fled. See Dennison, 65 US (24 How) at 109-10. In
overruling Dennison, the Branstad Court suggested that the Dennison Court's perception
of the power of the federal government was skewed because of the particular historical
circumstances in which the case arose. The Court observed that although "it seemed
clear to the Court in 1861 [sic], facing the looming shadow of a Civil War, that 'the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as
such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it,"' within fifteen years, that assumption seemed unwarranted. Branstad, 483 US at 227, quoting Dennison, 65 US (24
How) at 107.
69 Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 122.
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history the [Hans] Court could avoid discussing the unrelenting
popularpressurethat actually dictated its ultimate decision."70

Nor are the other examples we've considered plausibly interpreted as efforts to question the factual premises of the decisions at issue.71 Justice Thomas was hardly claiming that the
Hunt Court was under a false factual assumption about the contributions of American Catholics to public life. Nor were the
Hamdan amici arguing that Quirin was bad law because the
factual premises of the Court's reasoning were somehow faulty
or inaccurate.
D.

Using History to Impeach the Authority of a Past Decision

No, their arguments were about something else entirely.
Each of them sought to deny the precedential authority of one of
the Court's past decisions by challenging the sincerity or the impartiality of the past Court in offering reasons in support of it. I
refer to them as "impeaching" arguments because they are
structurally similar to the arguments lawyers often use to impeach witnesses at trial. Technically, impeaching arguments refer to any that have the effect of weakening the credibility of a
witness, which includes arguments that show defects in a witness's perception, memory, or narrative capacity.72 In this sense,
a court that contradicts the assumption on which a past court's
conclusion rests may also be said to "impeach" that court's decision. But here I use the concept of impeachment in the more
specific sense to refer to those arguments that undermine a witness's credibility by raising doubts about her impartiality or sincerity-that is, by attempting to show that she is either consciously lying or unconsciously biased in some way.7

70 Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 2001 (cited in note 24) (emphasis added). See Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 103-22 (Souter dissenting).
71 See notes 6-18 and accompanying text.
72 Richard 0. Lempert, et al, A Modern Approach to Evidence: Texts, Problems,
Transcripts and Cases 394-95 (West 4th ed 2011) (explaining that impeachment sometimes involves "revealing the limits of [a witness's] perception or memory of an event").
73 Impeaching a witness through bias is considered such a significant form of evidence that the Supreme Court has determined that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause protects the right of criminal defendants to cross-examine witnesses about
sources of bias. See Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 316-17 (1974) ("We have recognized
that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination."). See also Lempert, et
al, Evidence at 426 (cited in note 72) (observing that bias "is 'favored' as a mode of impeachment").
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My suggestion is that arguments like those discussed in the
Introduction, which seek to explain a past decision based on a
court's institutional interests or its bigoted attitudes, are analogous to a cross-examining lawyer's effort to discredit the testimony of a witness by suggesting that her testimony is biased or
that she has an interest in the case. Just as impeaching evidence in the trial context does not necessarily imply that the
witness is wrong about a given matter-just that he or she cannot be trusted on the issue one way or the other-the inference
supported by impeaching evidence in the precedential context is
not that the precedent was necessarily wrongly decided and
therefore must be overruled. Rather, it simply suggests that the
decision should no longer be treated as having settled the matter
or foreclosed further inquiry on the merits.74
Although both lay and expert witnesses can be impeached,
the analogy to an expert witness is particularly apt because both
judicial precedents and expert witnesses serve as forms of authority in their respective domains. Treating something as an
authority means taking the mere fact that the authority said or
did X as a reason to believe or do X.75 Thus, in both cases, impeaching evidence makes it less likely that the statements made
(or actions taken) by the authority in question are proper because it increases the likelihood that something other than the
authority's belief in the truth of the statement (or the propriety
of the action) explains why it said (or did) what it did.76
The essential similarity between the two kinds of argument
can be most vividly seen if one considers the more extreme case
74 Thus, the Hamdan amici close their brief with a request to the Court that it repudiate the Quirin decision, so that "without the heavy hand of Quirin on the scales of
justice, the Court can address the merits of the weighty constitutional issues presented
in this case." Legal Scholars Brief at *19 (cited in note 9). The distinction drawn in the
text is similar to that drawn by English courts between "overruling" and "undermining"
a precedent. See Rupert Cross and J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law 127-33 (Oxford 4th ed 1991) (explaining that according to English stare decisis doctrine, a past decision is "undermined" when it is revealed to have been based on a false assumption
about the law).
75
For this reason, philosophers often say that authorities provide their subjects
with content-independent reasons for action or belief. See Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in
Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence& Philosophy of Law 382, 400 (Oxford 2002) (observing, in the context of epistemic or "theoretical" authority, that such authorities are legitimate when "their directives are also conclusive reasons to believe that their content is justified").
76 See United States v Abel, 469 US 45, 51 (1984) (A successful showing of bias on
the part of a witness would have a tendency to make the facts to which he testified less
probable in the eyes of the jury than it would be without such testimony.").
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where a judge is accused of having a personal financial interest
in the outcome of a case but has refused to recuse herself. Such
cases are typically litigated as alleged violations of judicial codes
of conduct, though in particularly extreme instances they may
rise to the level of a constitutional violation of due process of
law.77 In either case, the claim is that the judge violated her professional duty by failing to recuse herself in a situation where
one might reasonably suspect that her impartiality and judgment would be (or would have been) compromised.7< The reasonable suspicion triggered by such circumstances depends on precisely the same background psychological assumptions as those
that underlie a cross-examining lawyer's effort to impeach an
expert by showing that she has a personal stake in the outcome
of the case or a financial reason to testify in one way rather than
another. In both cases, the assumption is that the prospect of
earning personal rewards is likely to influence a person's professional judgment, whether consciously or unconsciously.
Historicizing or impeaching arguments made in the context
of interpreting case law aim to expose a comparable defect, but
typically in a weaker sense. Consider again Justice Souter's argument. His claim was not that the Justices of the Court had a
personal financial interest in the outcome, but rather that the
Court's institutional interests might have been sufficiently powerful to influence its decision in an improper way.79 And the
77 See, for example, Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510, 516, 520, 535 (1927) (concluding
that a defendant's due process rights were violated when he was convicted under the
state's Prohibition Act by a mayor who presided over the case and who only received
payment for his services if the defendant was convicted). See also Caperton v AT. Massey Coal Co, 129 S Ct 2252, 2264-65 (2009) (holding that a judge's refusal to recuse himself from a case in which one of the parties had spent over $1 million more than either of
the campaign committees on behalf of the judge's electoral campaign and thus had "a
significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome" constituted a violation of due process of law).
78 See, for example, 28 USC § 455(a) ("Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."); Caperton, 129 S Ct at 2264, quoting Withrow v Larkin, 421
US 35, 47 (1975) ("Tlhe Court has asked whether, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented.") (quotation marks omitted).
79 Such institutional incentives can also trigger a due process violation. See Ward v
Village of Monroeville, 409 US 57, 60 (1972) (holding that due process was violated when
a mayor presided over cases in which the fines and fees he was authorized to levy
against parties funded a large portion of the town's income on the ground that the
"mayor's executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's court").
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point is not that any particular justice should have recused himself, but rather that, insofar as the decision seems to have been
influenced by such improper considerations, its status as precedent should thereby be cast into doubt. The same is true of Justice Thomas's suggestion in Mitchell that the Hunt Court's focus
on "pervasively sectarian" schools was motivated in part by antiCatholicism or the Hamdan amici's allegation of bias and interest in Quirin.80 The suggestion in each case is that the decision
in question was improperly motivated and so undeserving of
continuing deference.
Notably, in both contexts-assessing witness credibility and
evaluating the authority of past decisions-the consequence of
drawing the inference intended is often described metaphorically in terms of "weight." The weight of the expert's testimony is
weakened by impeaching evidence, just as the logic of impeaching arguments like Justice Souter's or Justice Thomas's is that
the explanation offered for a past decision-institutional interest in the one case, religious bigotry in the other-undermines
the precedential weight of that decision.8' In the same way, the
Hamdan amici's insistence that the historical evidence they adduced leaves Quirin "discredit[ed]" reveals the way in which
stare decisis implicates a notion of credibility, a concept more

traditionally associated with testimony.82
Analogizing such arguments to those made in the course of
evaluating witness testimony strikes me as useful and illuminating for primarily two reasons. First, it demonstrates the way
in which the legal system already not only tolerates but authorizes and privileges the kind of reasoning that such arguments
implicitly depend on-albeit in the quite different context of
Hunt, 413 US at 743.
81 Interestingly, Justice Souter sought to distance himself from the logic of his own
argument. He denied that he was arguing that "historical circumstance may undermine
an otherwise defensible decision." Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 122 n 17 (Souter
dissenting). Instead, he insisted that it was only because the legal analysis in Hans was
so poor that one was "forced to look elsewhere" for an explanation of the poor decision. Id
(Souter dissenting). But surely this is pure rhetoric. For while it is true that the quality
of the Hans Court's reasoning counts as its own sort of evidence as to the correctness of
its interpretation of the Constitution, either the evidence Justice Souter discussed about
the historical circumstances surrounding Hans is relevant to how the Court should treat
that case as a matter of precedent, or it is not relevant to that question. Whether it is
relevant depends on one's theory of precedent, as will be discussed in Part II below. But
if Justice Souter himself did not consider that evidence relevant, he presumably would
not have discussed it. No one, after all, was literally forcing him to look anywhere for an
explanation.
82 Legal Scholars Brief at *18 (cited in note 9).
80
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trial fact-finding.83 Second, it focuses attention on the way in
which such arguments aim to discredit a precedent, rather than
to engage directly with the underlying legal issues with which it
deals. It thereby underscores how precedential analysis involves
reasoning from authority.84
E.

A Preliminary Objection

An important objection to my characterization of impeaching or historicizing arguments remains. One might assert that,
as I have described them, such arguments depend on drawing a
naive distinction between law and politics that cannot survive
the lingering challenge of critical legal studies and, before that,
legal realism.85 In suggesting that Justice Souter's political explanation of Hans, for instance, might undermine that decision's
authority as precedent, I have assumed that one can distinguish
meaningfully between a decision determined by the law and one
determined by politics. In fact, though, the two are indistinguishable. The law-especially constitutional law-is so indeterminate that a court's decisions are effectively driven by the
judges' values. Whether one takes a romantic view of this process, seeing it as a legitimate part of a court's "best interpretation" of the relevant legal materials, or a more sinister view of it,
seeing it as the exertion of power masked as ideology,86 the
83 See FRE 607 ("Any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack
the witness's credibility.").
84 Nevertheless, I have found that some people either do not see the essential structural similarity between the two forms of argument or do not find the analogy useful,
perhaps because some of the more concrete differences between finding facts at trial and
interpreting texts on appeal cloud the underlying similarity. I must therefore emphasize
that no part of my core argument turns on the analogy to witness impeachment. (I qualify
this statement with the modifier "core," because I extend my argument in the Conclusion
in a way that, at least to my mind, derives further support from the use of impeaching
arguments in the trial context.) Those who remain unmoved by it may simply substitute
the term "historicizing" whenever I use the term "impeaching" below.
85 See Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies: A Political History, 100 Yale L J 1515,
1516 n 6 (1991) (listing the claim 'law is politics" as an example of a "general proposition[] on which most people committed to the [critical legal studies] project agree"). In
linking legal realism with critical legal studies I do not mean to suggest that the realists
made the same "law is politics" claim as the later critical legal theorists. They did not.
But both groups share in common a rejection of the view that application of traditional
legal materials is insufficient to decide cases. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,76 Tex L Rev 267, 299-300 (1997).
86 Compare Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 87 (Belknap 1986) ("Judges normally
recognize a duty to continue rather than discard the practice they have joined. So they
develop, in response to their own convictions and instincts, working theories about the
best interpretation of their responsibilities under that practice."), with J.M. Balkin,
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distinction between legal and political decisions falls apart and
so with it the coherence of the idea that one can undermine a
past decision by pointing out that it was based on "extralegal"
considerations.
Responding to this objection requires first distinguishing between a claim about the nature of law and a claim about how
judges should decide cases. The use df impeaching arguments
does not depend on any claim at all about what law is and
whether it differs from something called "politics." It only requires that some distinction be drawn between considerations
judges properly rely on when deciding cases and those they rely
on improperly. And even that is a very weak assumption. For
neither the realists nor the critical theorists denied that any distinction could be drawn between good and bad legal decision
making. Rather, they thought judges often did, and should, look
to other considerations, beyond the black-letter law, that they
deemed relevant to a fair or just resolution of the dispute.87
The use of impeaching arguments is perfectly consistent
with such an approach to deciding cases. Indeed, their use does
not depend on any particulartheory of what sources and considerations courts should rely on when adjudicating cases.88 Thus,
Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique,55 UMKC L Rev 392,
426 (1987) (observing that "[t]he whole point of the [critical legal studies] critique of
American law has been that judges do suffer from false consciousness, and the law does
reflect the ideological biases of judges," but emphasizing that the critical legal studies
view is "perfectly consistent with Dworkin's explanation of how judges decide cases").
87 See, for example, Leiter, 76 Tex L Rev at 275 (cited in note 85) (describing as the
"Core Claim" of legal realism the view that "judges reach decisions based on what they
think would be fair on the facts of the case, rather than on the basis of the applicable
rules of law"). Professor Leiter argues that Judge Jerome Frank had a particularly "extreme" interpretation of this claim. Id at 269. But even Judge Frank endorsed a normative theory of adjudication, albeit a rather idiosyncratic one. See Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind, 58 Buff L Rev 1127, 1129 (2010) (arguing that,
contrary to conventional wisdom, Judge Frank did develop a theory of adjudication). On
the critical legal theorist side, see, for example, Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685, 1777 (1976) (advocating that an "altruist judge" should "view himself as a resource whose effectiveness in the cause of substantive justice is to be maximized," which requires in part relying on standards, rather
than rules, when deciding cases).
88 In technical terms, we might say that the coherence of such arguments is "robust" with respect to different normative theories of adjudication. See Gerald F. Gaus,
Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory 5-6 (Oxford
1996) (explicating the concept of robustness, which describes the dependence of one theory's justification on another theory's justification). See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial
Sincerity, 94 Va L Rev 987, 1001 (2008):
The principle of legal justification is robust in relation to all but the most radical theories of adjudication. Because it leaves open what counts as a reason in
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for instance, under some theories of constitutional adjudication,
it may be perfectly appropriate for the Hans Court to have based
its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment on institutional
considerations, perhaps on the ground that maintaining its reputation as a strong institution is necessary for it to enforce its
judgments in a legitimate manner.89 For such a theory, the evidence adduced by Justice Souter would not impeach the decision. Instead, it would help vindicate it. But as long as one's theory of adjudication entails that there are any considerations that
are out of bounds for a court to contemplate, then that theory
leaves room for an impeaching argument. And a theory of adjudication that denies that there are any considerations that are
improper for a court to consider-even those based on the
judge's personal gain or in naked racial animus-would be a
radical and implausible one indeed.
II. IMPEACHING EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE OF PRECEDENT

This Part tackles what is potentially a far deeper problem
for the use of impeaching arguments. It might be argued that
the motivations behind a past court's decision are simply irrelevant to a present court's decision of whether to treat that past
decision as binding on it. Such historical facts are simply not
something with which courts are properly concerned at all.
That objection has some force. In fact, it is sometimes true.
But determining whether, and if so when, it is true requires a
careful philosophical analysis of the nature of, and justification
for, the practice of making decisions according to precedent.
Specifically, it depends on two related but distinct issues. First,
it depends on what the rationale is for treating past decisions as
authoritative sources of law generally. Second, it depends on
whether courts are authorized to make their own independent
judgments as to whether they are bound by past decisions they
recognize to be applicable to the case at hand.
This Part takes up each of these jurisprudential issues and
shows how their resolution determines the circumstances in
the context of judicial decisionmaking, it is compatible with a wide diversity of
theories. The principle could be endorsed by formalists, legal realists, textualists, purposivists, process theorists, pragmatists, and so on.

89 See Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 Ariz L Rev
1107, 1139-51 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court properly takes into account its
own reputation for being principled on the ground that doing so may be necessary to ensure that it can enforce its judgments generally and thus legitimately).
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which impeaching evidence of the sort described above would be
relevant to a court's inquiry. It then explains how the two issues
relate to each other so that the analysis in this Part can be applied more usefully to actual practices of precedent, a task taken
up in Part III. To foreshadow slightly, Part III argues that the
rationales for, and models of, precedent that recognize the relevance of impeaching evidence provide the most persuasive interpretations of stare decisis in the context of common law and
constitutional adjudication.
A. Why Past Decisions Bind Courts
There is a vast literature on precedent and the rationales
that may underlie it.90 Below I survey some of the most persua-

sive and commonly offered justifications and show why under
some, but not all, of the justifications for treating past decisions
as authoritative, impeaching evidence is relevant to a present
court's inquiry. For the purposes of this Section, I assume that
courts have authority to consider whether to accord a particular
past decision authoritative weight. In the following Section I relax this assumption, raising the possibility that they may be denied that authority entirely.
1. Rule-of-law values: certainty and formal equality.
The values of legal certainty and formal equality in some
ways reflect quite different concerns, but I consider them here
together under the general category of "rule of law" values.91
Probably the most common justification for precedent lies in its

90 See generally Cross and Harris, Precedent in English Law (cited in note 74);
Gerald J. Postema, On the Moral Presence of Our Past, 36 McGill L J 1153 (1991); Larry
Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent,63 S Cal L Rev 1 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan L Rev 571 (1987); Stephen R. Perry, JudicialObligation, Precedent and the
Common Law, 7 Oxford J Legal Stud 215 (1987); David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 Vand L Rev 495 (1985); Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory of Legal Justification (Stanford 1961); Robert H. Jackson, DecisionalLaw and Stare Decisis, 30 ABA J 334 (1944); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare
Decisis, 14 ABA J 71 (1928). See also Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality
in American Justice 262-89 (Princeton 1949).
91 In doing so, I do not mean to suggest that vindicating such values is sufficient to
establish the rule of law, which is a controversial claim. See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 Ga L Rev 1, 5 (2008) ("I shall argue that our understanding
of the Rule of Law should emphasize not only the value of settled, determinate rules and
the predictability that such rules make possible, but also the importance of the procedural and argumentative aspects of legal practice.").
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capacity to ensure legal certainty.92 Following precedent generates a number of benefits in this regard: it enables people to
predict how the state's coercive power will be exercised so that
they can exercise their autonomy in making plans,93 as well as to
coordinate their behavior with others;94 it protects the interests
of those who have already relied on past decisions;95 it curbs the
discretion of judges, thereby limiting potential abuses of power; 96
and, more generally, it fosters political stability by ensuring a
degree of continuity in the structure of rights and duties.97 In
addition to these benefits, treating the holdings of past decisions
as binding on present courts serves the goal of equality by
"treating like cases alike."98
Impeaching evidence would not be relevant to a court's decision to follow precedent solely for the purpose of ensuring legal

92 See Wasserstrom, The JudicialDecision at 60 (cited in note 90) ("The reason that
undoubtedly is most often cited as constituting a justification for the doctrine of precedent is that its consistent application assures to the legal system a degree of certainty
which would otherwise be impossible to attain.").
93 See Schauer, 39 Stan L Rev at 597 (cited in note 90):

When a decisionmaker must decide [a] case in the same way as the last, parties will be better able to anticipate the future. The ability to predict what a
decisionmaker will do helps us plan our lives, have some degree of repose, and
avoid the paralysis of foreseeing only the unknown.
94 See Scott Hershovitz, Integrity and Stare Decisis, in Scott Hershovitz, ed, Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudenceof Ronald Dworkin 103, 108 (Oxford 2006) (observing that coordination benefits contribute to the justification of the practice of so-called
vertical precedent).
95 See Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 14 (cited in note 90) ("[S]ome people, despite
the lack of any formal practice of precedent following, will justifiably rely on the precedent court's opinion and will modify their behavior in response to it. A constrained court,
therefore, should take that behavior into account when determining what decision to
reach."); Frank, Courts on Trial at 286 (cited in note 90) ("Most important are the cases
in which there has been actual reliance upon the precedents, so that it would be unjust
to change them, retroactively, as to persons who have thus relied.").
96 See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va
L Rev 1, 4-5 (2001) (observing that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "Americans viewed stare decisis as a way to restrain the 'arbitrary discretion' of courts"). See
also Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 529 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed).
97 See Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal
Reasoning 43 (Harvard 2009) ("Stare decisis, in thus valuing settlement for settlement's
sake and consistency for consistency's sake, serves a range of values all having something to do with stability."); Frank, Courts on Trial at 268 (cited in note 90) ("A more
powerful argument for stare decisis rests on the need for stability. Only if rules are certain and stable, it is said, can men conduct their affairs with safety.").
98 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 113 (Harvard 1977) ("The gravitational force of a precedent may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to the fairness of treating like cases alike.").
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certainty or treating like cases alike. The reason lies in the purely formal quality of these justifications; that is, the relevant
benefits accrue irrespective of the content of the rule embodied
in the past decision and, therefore, irrespective of anything that
might bear on the court's reasoning in support of that rule.99 If
the sole and sufficient reason to follow Hans, for instance, is that
states have relied on the immunity from suits brought by their
own citizens that Hans ensured, then that remains a reason to
follow it regardless of whether the case was rightly decided or
how the court reached its decision. Or if the point of treating
Hunt as binding precedent is to ensure that the parties in
Mitchell were treated in a relevantly similar way to the parties
in Hunt, then that goal is achieved irrespective of whether the
Hunt Court was motivated by some sort of religious animus.100

2. Epistemic deference.
Under the epistemic-deference rationale, courts follow precedent because they presume the previous case to have been correctly decided.101 The justification for such an assumption varies
depending on the context. In the context of vertical precedent,
for instance, superior courts are sometimes said to have greater
expertise than lower courts or to have more time and resources
to decide difficult legal issues.102 In the context of common law
99 See Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at 62 (cited in note 97) ("With respect to
both rules and precedents, the key idea is that they are authoritative.Their force derives
not from their soundness but from their status, and philosophers of law refer to this feature of authority as content-independence."). Although Professor Schauer characterizes
all decision making according to precedent as content-independent, we will see below
that some justifications are, in a sense, more independent of content than others.
100 Of course, if the criterion determining relevance is itself morally objectionable, as
Justice Thomas suggested, then it is hard to see why perpetuating the injustice is justified. And that is precisely why some philosophers have questioned how much work the
equality value does in justifying a regime of precedent. See, for example, Alexander, 63 S
Cal L Rev at 10 (cited in note 90).
101 See Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision at 43 (cited in note 90) (ascribing to
John W. Salmond the view that past cases are presumed to be correct); John Harrison,
The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke L J 503, 512 (2000) ("Precedent means that prior decisions are taken as correct, or correct unless shown otherwise
to some requisite degree.").
102 See Hershovitz, Exploring Law's Empire at 108 (cited in note 94) ("To the extent
that higher court judges have superior expertise to lower court judges (or even simply
more time and resources to bring to bear on a case), lower court deference to the ruling of
higher courts will improve lower court decision making."); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,46 Stan L Rev 817, 838 (1994) ("If we
suppose decisionmakers in higher courts are more proficient at legal reasoning, we may
conclude they are more likely to arrive at 'better' answers than lower courts.").
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stare decisis, the deference to past decisions is grounded on the
view, associated particularly with the thought of Edmund
Burke, that in the realm of human affairs, it is wiser to defer to
the collective judgments of the past than to attempt to use reason to organize society according to abstract principles.103
In either case, though, the critical point is that the presumption of correctness is justified on epistemic grounds.104 Athough one could coherently assert that courts presume past cases to have been correctly decided in order to protect reliance
interests,os this rationale asserts something stronger, namely
that courts presume past cases to have been correctly decided
because that is actually likely to be the case. And this is true
whether one defines "correctness" in terms of justice, fidelity to
natural law, fidelity to written law, efficiency, or any other
criterion.
The epistemic-deference rationale is made more plausible as
a general justification for following precedent if one assumes
that concerns about institutional efficiency also come into play.
It has long been argued that courts defer to precedent in part to
avoid having to rethink the underlying considerations relevant
to any particular dispute.106 The epistemic rationale provides a
103 See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L J 1029, 1056
(1990) (discussing Edmund Burke in defending the practice of stare decisis partly on the
ground that "[tihe usages and institutions of every long-established political regime represent an accumulated fund of wisdom and experience, and any generation would be presumptuous . . . to think it can replace this fund using only its own intellectual resources"); David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 41 (Oxford 2010) (quoting Burke
and arguing that the common law practice of stare decisis is premised on the idea that
"[i]t is an act of intellectual hubris" to think that one knows better than the "accumulated wisdom" of the past); Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 Harv J L & Pub Pol 509,
509-11 (1996) (describing and endorsing a theory of constitutional interpretation he
dubs "conventionalism," which accords a strong role to precedent and which draws its
inspiration from the thought of Edmund Burke).
104 In the philosophical literature on authority, this is sometimes called "theoretical
authority." See Shapiro, Authority at 399 (cited in note 75) (observing that "the rationality of relying on theoretical authority seems unproblematic" because "[w]hen some person
knows more about a subject that [sic] one does, it makes good sense to defer to that person's judgment").
105 Evidentiary presumptions, for instance, are often justified on policy grounds. See
Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 3.2 at 61-62 (West 3d ed
1996) (listing various evidentiary presumptions and explaining that for some of them,
"the probative force of the basic facts may not be so convincing, yet some policy rationale
or procedural convenience may make the presumed conclusion desirable").
106 See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (Yale 1921)
("[Tihe labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on
the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him."); Schauer,
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justification for doing just that: if it is likely that the past court's
holding is correct, then the present court can simply assume
that the holding is valid and defer to the previous court's judgment.10
Unlike the rule-of-law rationale for following precedent, the
epistemic-deference rationale does imply the relevance of impeaching evidence to a court's determination of whether to treat
a past decision as binding on it. Indeed, under this rationale the
analogy to the expert at trial fits perfectly. Although such epistemic deference may generally be justified, if in a given case
there is historical evidence presented suggesting that the Court
was less concerned with getting the law right than with pursuing some "extralegal" goal (such as preserving the court's institutional authority or appeasing a powerful wartime President),
then that will make it more likely that such deference is not in
fact justified in this case.
Seminole Tribe offers a nice illustration of how impeaching
evidence bears on the epistemic-deference rationale. There, the
Court justified its deference to Hans's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in part on the ground that the Hans Court had
a "much closer vantage point" than did the dissent from which to
analyze the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.108 But if Jus-

tice Souter is right that the Court had strong institutional reasons to decline jurisdiction over the plaintiffs case, then that
fact would quite reasonably cast doubt on the Court's assumption that the Hans Court's decision was due to its closer "vantage point" to the drafting of the Eleventh Amendment. True,
Thinking Like a Lawyer at 43 (cited in note 97) (observing that "stare decisis brings the
advantages of cognitive and decisional efficiency").
107 To the extent that this efficiency rationale does underlie the practice of following
precedent, it reveals the mistake in limiting the concept of "following precedent" to include only those situations where a court obeys a past decision even though it believes it
to have been wrongly decided. See, for example, Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 4 (cited in
note 90) (limiting his discussion of precedent to those situations where a precedent may
be said to "constrain a subsequent court of lesser or equal authority to reach a decision
different from the one the latter court would have reached in the absence of the precedent case"); Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at 88 (cited in note 97) (distinguishing the
use of precedent from reasoning by analogy on the ground that "in the latter a previous
decision is selected in order to support an argument now, while in the former a previous
decision imposes itself to preclude an otherwise preferred outcome"). Doing so is a mistake because under the efficiency-of-decision-making view, if the rule of a previous decision is clearly applicable to the set of facts with which a court is presented, then in theory the court does not ever reach an independent conclusion about what the right outcome
would be but for the binding precedent.
10 Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 69.
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such evidence may not be sufficient to deprive the decision of its
precedential weight, since it is certainly possible that the institutional pressures on the Court aligned with its own independent constitutional analysis. But insofar as the Seminole Tribe
Court was deferring to the judgment of the Hans Court, such
facts are at least relevant, in the technical sense of that word, to
whether Hans deserves to be accorded precedential weight.109
One might object that for a court to consider such evidence
defeats the whole purpose of treating a past decision as authoritative. If, as suggested, the premise of the practice is that it is
not worthwhile to have later courts reconsider the underlying
merits of the earlier decision, then for a court to consider the
reasoning of the past decision is to defeat the rationale on which
the practice is based.110
Below we will consider more generally the question of
whether a later court is authorized to make an independent
evaluation of whether to treat a past decision as binding on it.
But here it is worth pointing out why this objection fails-it
misses precisely what is distinctive about impeaching evidence.
When considering such evidence, the court is not reevaluating
the underlying reasons that led the past court to reach its decision. Rather, it is considering evidence bearing on whether the
assumption which justifies its treatment of the precedent as an
authority actually holds.111 Again, the comparison to deference to

authority in the trial context is revealing: since the purpose of
allowing experts to testify is that they are able to opine on matters which the jury is not competent to assess, it may be irrational for the jury to try to evaluate the expert's underlying

109 See FRE 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.").
110 Put into the terms of Professor Joseph Raz's "service conception" of authority, the
claim would be that in considering such evidence, the court is failing to treat the precedent as providing the present court with "pre-emptive" reasons that properly replace the
court's "dependent" reasons that already apply to it. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 59-60 (Clarendon 1986). See also Shapiro, Authority at 404 (cited in note 75) (explaining that under Professor Raz's view, for parties to consider an arbitrator's ruling as
an ordinary reason rather than a preemptive reason would be to "vitiate the purpose of
the arbitration" since the arbitrator's decision "is supposed to eliminate the need to deliberate and debate the merits of the case that they have submitted").
111 See Raz, Morality of Freedom at 42 (cited in note 110) (using an arbitrator as an
example of an authority and explaining that if "the arbitrator was bribed, or was drunk
while considering the case . . . each party may ignore the decision").
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reasoning.112 But if the jury learns that the expert has a reason

to be biased or interested in some way, then, for the reasons already discussed in Part I, the jury may rationally take that fact
into account.113 In the same way, a court that considers evidence
impeaching a particular decision does not defeat the purpose of
treating past decisions authoritatively as a general matter.
3. Integrity.
More recently, scholars have offered a justification for following precedent that might best be described as a moral rationale. Like the equality rationale, this view sees following
precedent as valuable because it involves treating people in a
consistent way over time and across jurisdictions.114 But it recognizes that this value cannot be entirely explained by reference
to the fairness of "treating like cases alike."116 Instead, it insists
that there is inherent value in the state treating its citizens in a
coherent and principledway. This typically involves analogizing
a political community to an individual person.116 Proponents of

112 See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107
Yale L J 1535, 1552-53 (1998) (asking rhetorically, "if a judge or a jury does not have the
requisite scientific training, how can that judge or jury make a warranted choice between competing 'vigorously cross-examined' claims by putative experts in, say, medicine, mathematics, chemistry, or biology?").
113 See notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
114 See, for example, Dworkin, Law's Empire at 165-66 (cited in note 86) (describing
and endorsing an ideal of "integrity" that "requires government to speak with one voice,
to act in a principled and coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to everyone
the substantive standards of justice or fairness it uses for some"); Postema, 36 McGill L J
at 1177 (cited in note 90) ("Integrity in a community takes the form of an ideal of equality, not the formal or abstract equality of treating like cases alike, but substantive equality, equality among members in recognition of their co-membership.").
115 Postema, 36 McGill L J at 1168 (cited in note 90) ("[F]rom the fact that past decisions project as it were a way of treating people the same, it does not follow that that is a
way of treating them fairly, or that people are treated unfairly if this projection is not
followed."). See also Dworkin, Law's Empire at 183 (cited in note 86) ("We cannot explain
our hostility to internal compromise by appeal to principles of either fairness or justice
as we have defined those virtues.").
116 See Dworkin, Law's Empire at 167 (cited in note 86) ("Political integrity assumes
a particularly deep personification of the community or state."); Postema, 36 McGill L J
at 1176 (cited in note 90):
The thesis I shall now defend on the basis of the analogy to the argument in
the individual case is that we can trace the importance of the moral presence of
our past, and of precedent in particular, to the duty to keep faith with each
other, in both dimensions of our communal relations.
Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of ConstitutionalSelf-Government 93 (Yale
2001) ("I will be obliged to confront the great difficulties involved in supposing that a
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this view then suggest that in both cases we can recognize, and
should admire, a certain integrity or adherence to principles and
commitments across domains and over time.117 By seeking to ensure that courts apply the same rules and principles as other
courts have, the practice of precedent expresses and embodies
the moral principle of integrity.11a
As with the epistemic-deference rationale, impeaching evidence would indeed be relevant under the integrity rationale for
following precedent, though here the reason is less straightforward. It lies in the weakened moral force of a decision that did
not itself demonstrate a concern with integrity. Consider a person who is faced with a decision and is trying to figure out
whether, in making the decision, integrity requires her to remain faithful to an earlier decision or commitment she made.
Suppose she reads an old journal she kept at the time of the first
decision and learns that she only made that earlier decision for
some selfish, short-term reason (such as to turn a quick profit or
to gratify a sexual impulse). It seems plausible to think that the
earlier decision or commitment ought not any longer constrain
her future efforts to act with integrity since, in retrospect, the
reason for that earlier decision appears shortsighted or ephemeral.

people might be regarded as a collective agent, persisting over time, able to make and to
live under its own commitments.").
117 See Dworkin, Law's Empire at 172 (cited in note 86) (explaining that his theory
of law as integrity "assumes that the community can adopt and express and be faithful
or unfaithful to principles of its own, distinct from those of any of its officials or citizens
as individuals"); Postema, 36 McGill L J at 1176 (cited in note 90) ("If we, in and through
the communities we constitute, are to deliberate and act purposively and responsibly in
time, we must be able to see our common actions as fitting into meaningful patterns and
practices through time."); Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time at 43 (cited in note 116) (describing the Constitution as "a democratic effort by a people to write down and live up to
its own foundational commitments over time").
11s See Postema, 36 McGill L J at 1177-78 (cited in note 90) ("In this notion of communal integrity and its expression in a distinctive notion of equality, we can account for
the moral force of precedent."); Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time at 189 (cited in note 116)
("Mhe precedentialist, common law style of adjudication is the means through which a
judiciary, holding certain results more or less constant, gives meaning to legal and political commitments over time."). Professor Dworkin does not explicitly state that integrity
justifies the practice of following precedent, but it seems implicit in what he calls "adjudicative integrity." Dworkin, Law's Empire at 167, 217-29, 337 (discussing how the adjudicative principle of integrity "asks those responsible for deciding what the law is to
see and enforce it as coherent in that way"). See also Hershovitz, Exploring Law's Empire at 115 (cited in note 94) ("A court displays integrity when its decisions reflect a
commitment to a coherent and defensible view of the rights and duties people have under the law. Such a commitment can only be displayed by a pattern of decisions across
time.").
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And that is true even if the reasons she offered at the time in
support of the decision were plausible ones.
The same is true when a court considers whether to defer to
one of its past decisions for reasons of integrity. If there are facts
that suggest that the Court in a past case decided the way it did
for temporary, political reasons or for other reasons that we consider irrelevant to principled adjudication-such as those Justice Souter purports to uncover in his discussion of Hans or the
anti-Catholic prejudice Justice Thomas found in Hunt-then
those facts seem relevant to whether the Court has any obligation to remain faithful to it. And this logic applies not only to
past decisions of the same court, but also to those of other
courts. Having integrity, under this view, means being principled over time and across jurisdictions and subject matters. 119 So
if it turns out that a decision of one court is binding on another
for reasons of integrity, a discovery that that court was not making a good-faith effort to be principled is a reason to refuse to
treat that court's decision as authoritative.120
Note, though, that this is true not for epistemic reasons, but
rather for moral ones-that is, for reasons of integrity. So it is
not that the "extralegal" explanations of Hans or Hunt count as
evidence that the constitutional analyses underlying them were
poor; rather, the point is that the obligation that political integrity normally imposes on us to respect past decisions is weakened if those Courts were not themselves respecting the demands of integrity. We might say, then, not that a decision's
credibility is impeached by the historical evidence, but rather
that its characteris impugned by it.121

119 See Dworkin, Law's Empire at 243 (cited in note 86) ("Law as integrity asks
judges to assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of
principles about justice and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases that come before them.").
120 See Jackson, 30 ABA J at 335 (cited in note 90):
The first essential of a lasting precedent is that the court or the majority that
promulgates it be fully committed to its principle. That means such individual
study of its background and antecedents, its draftsmanship and effects that at
least when it is announced it represents not a mere acquiescence but a conviction of those who support it.
Postema, 36 McGill L J at 1179 (cited in note 90) (criticizing Professor Dworkin's view on
the ground that it assumes "that participants have been behaving in a way that is consistent with its underlying commitments, and that the only question is what these commitments are").
121 The survey of rationales in this Section is far from exhaustive. I have focused
here only on those that have received the most support from courts and scholars. I have
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How Strictly Past Decisions Bind Courts

Even if impeaching evidence is relevant to a court's evaluation of the precedential weight of a past decision, a court may
not properly consider such evidence if the practice does not authorize it to make such a determination.122 It is thus helpful to
distinguish among three different ways in which precedential
practice might structure how a court treats past decisions. Such
decisions may bind courts absolutely, presumptively, or not at
all.
1. Past decisions as absolutely binding.
A precedential practice may require that, when a past decision is clearly applicable to the legal issue that a present court
confronts, the court must in all cases follow the holding of that
decision.123 If a practice is so structured, then regardless of what
rationale justifies the practice overall, no individual court would
be authorized to consider the persuasiveness of evidence purporting to impeach one of its precedents. A precedential practice
might be based on the epistemic-deference rationale, for
omitted, for instance, the rationale according to which courts should follow precedent
because doing so gives courts the appearance of being principled decision-making bodies.
See Casey, 505 US at 865-66:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept
its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such,
no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.
See also Hellman, 37 Ariz L Rev at 1116-19 (cited in note 89) (defending the Casey
Court's reasoning on the ground that the Court may need to appear principled in order to
legitimately enforce its decisions). Moreover, I have considered only normative justifications for following precedent and so have not included those interpretations that might
explain, as a causal matter, why Anglo-American law has developed precedential practices. It may be, for instance, that the practice of following precedent is a manifestation
of the fact that judges and lawyers pervasively suffer from a "status quo bias," a term
psychologists have used to describe people's tendency to overvalue the current state of
affairs over alternative ones. See generally Robert L. Scharff and Franceso Parisi, The
Role of Status Quo Bias and Bayesian Learning in the Creation of Legal Rights, 3 J L
Econ & Pol 25 (2006). See also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J Econ
Persp 193, 197-99 (Winter 1991).
122 Of course, such a court will always have to determine if the precedent appliesand, as we'll see, that is often difficult to do-but the issue here is whether, assuming
the decision's holding applies to the case, the court must follow it.
123 Professor Schauer refers to legal sources that bind in this way as "[m]andatory
authorities." Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 Va L Rev 1931, 1940
(2008) (observing that the decisions of superior courts are called "mandatory authorities"
for lower courts because they must be followed).
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instance, on the ground that in general the decisions of past
courts are more likely to be correct (or no more likely to be
wrong) than those of present courts. But because the practice
makes that judgment at the categorical level, perhaps because it
suspects that a present court is likely to err in determining
whether the rationale applies to the case before it (or whether
some countervailing reason overrides it), the practice denies
courts the power to consider the issue of whether to treat a past
decision as authoritative.124 In such a precedential practice, impeaching evidence does not even get off the ground.
2. Past decisions as presumptively binding.
That a court must treat a past decision as binding, however,
does not entail that it must treat it as absolutely binding in all
cases.125 A precedential practice could treat past decisions as
generally binding on present courts but allow that in certain circumstances a court may determine, if there is good reason to,
that the precedent should not bind it.126 Under this view, then,
the fact that a precedent exists on a given issue imposes on present courts a burden of justification they must meet before deciding that they will not follow it.127
Even if a practice considers past decisions as only presumptively binding, however, that fact alone is not sufficient to put
impeaching evidence on the table as something a court may
124 Of course, one could ask all the same questions about what justifies the practice's
particular allocation of decision-making authority. But such questions may lead to an
infinite regress with no satisfying ultimate answers. See Steven D. Smith, Hart's Onion:
The Peeling Away of Legal Authority, 16 S Cal Interdisc L J 97, 117-28 (2006) (arguing
that no justification for political authority is ultimately persuasive, even one grounded in
natural law or a duty to obey God).
125 See Schauer, 94 Va L Rev at 1953 (cited in note 123) ("There is no reason [] why
an authoritative prescription need be understood as absolute or determinative.").
126 See, for example, Casey, 505 US at 864 (observing that even in constitutional
cases, the view "repeated in our cases" is that "a decision to overrule should rest on some
special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided"); Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at 76 (cited in note 97) (observing that the Supreme Court
requires a "special justification" for overturning a precedent beyond its mere incorrectness); Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 59 (cited in note 90) (arguing that in the context of
statutory or constitutional interpretation, "the constrained court must find a precedent
under a statute or constitutional provision to be both incorrect and something else").
127 See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 109 (Clarendon 1991) (explaining that
rules of thumb are "not devoid of normative force" on the ground that they "will ordinarily be taken to increase the burden of justification for acting inconsistently with the rule
of thumb" and so "elevat[e] the level of confidence necessary for taking action inconsistent with them").
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permissibly consider when evaluating precedent. Two further
conditions must be met. First and most obviously, the rationale
for treating decisions as binding (even if only presumptively so)
must not be exhausted by the purely formal rule-of-law values
discussed above since,128 if it is, impeaching evidence is not even
relevant to the question of whether to treat them as authoritative.
Second, the practice must allow that the burden of justification necessary to overrule a past decision may be met at least in
part by a showing that the rationale for generally treating past
decisions as binding does not apply in the particular case. So, for
instance, if a doctrine of precedent were to require courts to always treat past decisions as binding unless a particular decision
has resulted in grave injustice or proved impossibly unworkable,
then evidence impeaching the reasoning of a past decision would
still not be relevant to a court's analysis. And that is true irrespective of which rationale justifies deferring to past decisions
more generally.
If, however, all of these conditions are met, so that (1) past
decisions are treated as only presumptively binding, (2) the
practice is justified substantially on either the epistemicdeference or integrity rationale (or another rationale that allows
for the relevance of impeachment evidence), and (3) courts are
authorized to assess the applicability of those rationales to particular decisions, then impeaching evidence would be properly
considered by a court in deciding whether to treat a past decision as binding.
3. Past decisions as not binding at all.
The two forms of precedential practice just described treat
past decisions as genuinely authoritativesources of law. That is,
they require courts to treat the existence of a precedent on a given legal issue as either a dispositive reason or a presumptive
reason for the court to exclude other factors it would otherwise
consider relevant to the issue it faces.129 But a precedential practice could exist in which courts discuss and cite past decisions in

128 See Part II.A.1.
129 See Raz, Morality of Freedom at 59 (cited in note 110) (describing a conception of
authority according to which an authority's directives "replace people's own judgment on
the merits of the case").

1658

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:1625

their opinions but do not in fact treat them as truly binding.1ao
Under this view, a court's primary obligation is to decide the
case before it in a way that achieves the overall best outcome on
the merits even if that means overruling decisions that it considers incorrect.131

Such a practice does not require that courts be unconcerned
with the values discussed in the previous Section. In deciding
what the best overall outcome is, for instance, a court might
properly consider the parties' reliance interests based on a prior
decision or even the value of maintaining integrity with the rest
of the case law.132 But it does mean that they treat past decisions
as first-order considerations that contribute to determining what
the right decision is, rather than as genuinely authoritative
sources of law that foreclose the court from considering certain
deliberative options or that impose a burden of justification on
the court that it must overcome before overruling a precedent.133
For this reason, some deny that such a practice should be called
"following precedent" at all.134
Regardless of its name, it is not clear that impeaching evidence would have much of a role, if any, to play in such a practice. The reason is not that courts are foreclosed from considering impeaching evidence, but rather that such evidence would
130 See Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at 118 (cited in note 97) (describing a view
of the common law that holds that its rules "are not operating as rules at all and that all
of the work is being done by the rule-free determination of the optimal result").
131 Of course, the merits may include conformity to other sources of law, such as a
written constitution or statute. But the point is that the precedent does not stand in the
way of a court's judgment about the outcome the court would reach if the precedent had
not been decided. See Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in Laurence Goldstein, ed, Precedent in Law 183, 210 (Clarendon 1991) (endorsing
what he calls a "natural law theory of precedent" according to which "one sees the common law as being nothing else but what is morally correct, all things considered").
132 See Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 8 (cited in note 90) (describing Professor
Moore's natural law theory and observing that "[w]hat is morally correct, of course, will
be a function of facts about the parties and the world" and that "these facts might include the equality and reliance effects of earlier court decisions").
133 Ultimately, the distinction between authoritative and deliberative forms of decision making may break down, because it is always possible to frame a decision to defer to
an authority in terms of first-order rational deliberation. When a patient follows her doctor's orders, for instance, one could interpret her action as an instance of deference to the
doctor's judgment, or as an instance of taking the fact of the doctor having uttered the
order (along with other facts about the doctor's education and qualifications) as its own
kind of evidence of what she should do. But the rough distinction is sufficiently intuitive
and entrenched in philosophical thinking about decision making as to justify its continued use. See, for example, Raz, Morality of Freedom at 28-31 (cited in note 110).
134 Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 9 (cited in note 90) (observing that "[i]t is perhaps
misleading" to label this theory of precedent "as precedent following at all").
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not be relevant to-or would have only minimal probative value
for-the court's essential task, which is to determine what the
best overall outcome is given the facts at hand. So although the
reliance interests generated by a previous decision might justify
a current court in deciding in a way consistent with that decision, how the past court reasoned to its decisions seems irrelevant to what makes the outcome today the best one available.135
Perhaps impeaching evidence would loosen any demands of integrity the court would otherwise attend to, but it would do so
only as one of many factors otherwise bearing on the court's
decision.
C. Summary
The upshot of the foregoing analysis, as represented in Table 1 below, is that impeaching evidence is relevant when either
the epistemic-deference or integrity rationales (or both) at least
in part explain why courts treat past cases as authoritative and
where the model of precedent requires some, but not total, genuine deference to past decisions. Although these conditions represent only two of the nine total boxes in Table 1, it turns out
that-as the next Part will show-this combination of rationales

135 One might argue that impeaching evidence that reveals a past decision to have
been based on improper considerations is relevant if we make the reasonable assumption
that parties look in part to the reasons courts offer-not just the outcome-for guidance
in future cases. The reasoning would go like this: If the parties are aware of circumstances that a later court will likely deem to be impeaching evidence, then parties will
predict that future courts will ignore that decision in future cases and will not rely on it
as precedent. And since even courts that do not treat past decisions as genuinely authoritative may nevertheless properly consider the reliance interests at stake in a dispute
insofar as those interests must be weighed in determining what the best overall outcome
in the present case is, such courts will find impeaching evidence relevant to their decision because it will tell them how likely it is that there are considerable reliance interests at stake to be weighed.
This interesting suggestion, which I thank the editors of The University of Chicago
Law Review for raising, seems plausible to me. And if it is right, then it suggests that
impeaching evidence is relevant under even more models of precedent than I claim in the
text. But I doubt that such evidence would be very helpful in practice for courts using
this model of precedent. The chief virtue of the nonbinding model, after all, is the way in
which it frees courts to make the overall morally best outcome in the present case, so it
is only in cases where the actual reliance interests are considerable that those reliance
interests will likely make a difference-otherwise, courts will be concerned primarily
with the substantive underlying merits of the decision. True, such interests may indeed
be considerable in some areas of law-such as in criminal law or property law-but even
in those contexts there is likely to be better and more direct evidence of reliance, such as
the party's own behavior.
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and models best describes the practice of stare decisis in both
the common law and constitutional context.
TABLE 1. RELEVANCE OF IMPEACHING EVIDENCE

Rationales for Precedent

Absolutely
Binding
Presumptively
Q gBinding

Nonbinding

Rule of
Law

Epistemic
Deference

Integrity

Not Relevant

Not Relevant

Not Relevant

Not Relevant

Relevant

Relevant

Not Relevant

(or Minimally

I4Not Relevant
I

Not Relevant
Relevant)

III. APPLICATIONS
The analysis of precedent thus far has been exceedingly abstract. It has investigated the propriety of a court's consideration of impeaching evidence under various rationales for, and
models of, following precedent. In doing so, it has assumed that
past decisions have a holding or rule that is relatively easy for
courts to identify and thus follow. In fact, though, courts and
scholars have long debated not only how courts ought to go
about the difficult task of identifying the holding of a past decision (and distinguishing it from dicta), but also whether or when
present courts are even properly bound by the holdings, rather
than just the results, of past decisions.136
This Part takes up the task of applying the foregoing analysis to actual court practices in order to determine whether impeaching evidence might properly be considered in each of them.
In doing so, the complications just mentioned will be useful because they provide evidence of what kind of model best fits the
136 Compare Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40
Yale L J 161, 164, 182 (1930) (arguing that the "ratio decidendi" of a case cannot be discovered by looking to the reasons offered by courts but rather by looking to which facts
the court considered material to the outcome), with Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at
51-52 (cited in note 97) (criticizing Professor Goodhart's view on the ground that one
cannot determine materiality without first having identified what the relevant rule is).
See also Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at 44-54 (cited in note 97) (discussing various
views about how to identify a precedent and its holding).
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various practices. The more flexibility a practice affords present
courts in determining which parts of past decisions (the holding,
rationale, or result) bind them, the further away that precedential practice is from the absolutely binding model described in
the last Part and the closer it is to a presumptive or even nonbinding model.
A.

Vertical Precedent

Vertical precedent describes the practice whereby lower
courts are obligated to obey the holdings of superior courts.13 7
Evidence impeaching the holding of a superior court's decision
may very well not be something that a lower court properly considers. This is true primarily for two reasons.
First, vertical precedent is as close to an absolutely binding
model of precedent as there is in Anglo-American law.138 Thus,
even if the lower court has good reason to doubt the correctness
of the superior court's decision, it is generally not permitted to
ignore the decision on that ground39 Of course, where the reach
of a superior court's holding is a question of debate, lower courts
may conclude that it does not apply to the particular case at
hand by distinguishing it on the facts. But at least with respect
to the cases where the rule or holding of a precedent is clear, the
lower court is compelled to follow it. Thus, in this situation, as
we have seen,140 the lower court is not authorized to determine
independently whether evidence bearing on the correctness of
the previous decision, including impeaching evidence, undermines that decision. Instead, it must simply comply with its ruling.
But the second, deeper reason is that the absolutely binding
quality of superior court decisions on lower courts is itself evidence that the rationale for the practice lies in its vindication of

137 See Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at 36-37 (cited in note 97) (distinguishing
between vertical and horizontal precedent).
138 See id at 68 (explaining that lower courts are bound or "compelled" to follow superior court decisions).
139 See State Oil, 552 US at 20; Simmons, 543 US at 593-94 (O'Connor dissenting)
("[I]t remains this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents. That is so
even where subsequent decisions or factual developments may appear to have significantly undermined the rationale for our earlier holding.") (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
140 Part II.B.1.
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rule-of-law values.ux1 It is true that vertical precedent is sometimes said to be premised on an epistemic-deference rationale,
not because judges on higher courts are necessarily smarter or
better lawyers or more just than are those serving on lower
courts, but rather because appellate courts typically have more
time to consider difficult legal questions and have received better briefing by lawyers than lower courts have.142 But this suggestion is not particularly persuasive. Imagine, for example,
that the epistemic advantages of superior courts were erased entirely, perhaps by increasing the funding of lower courts, so that
they had more resources, more time, and better-qualified judges. 43 Would even such a dramatic change prompt a reconsideration of the doctrine that superior court decisions are binding on
lower courts? If that consequence seems doubtful, then it suggests that something else may be driving the practice.144
That "something else" is unlikely to be the value of political
integrity. True, vertical precedent does vindicate a kind of integrity, ensuring that different courts within the same political
community speak with a consistent voice. But if that were the
dominant concern of courts, then it seems that they would be
equally compelled to follow other courts of their same level in
other jurisdictions, whereas deference to such courts is typically
understood to be optional.145
Rather, that "something else" is most likely the rule-of-law
and coordination benefits that accrue from having one rule govern a given jurisdiction rather than many. 46 As Professor Evan
Caminker has observed, such benefits include the greater predictability that citizens will have to plan their affairs, the
protection of reliance interests, and equal application of the
141 See Caminker, 46 Stan L Rev at 822 (cited in note 102) ("Ultimately, a desire for
bright-line rules may largely underpin the particular value tradeoffs [the practice of vertical precedent] entails."); Hershovitz, Exploring Law's Empire at 108 (cited in note 94)
(arguing that vertical precedent is justified primarily by the coordination benefits it generates and the expertise of superior courts).
142 Caminker, 46 Stan L Rev at 848 (cited in note 102) ("[A] district court generally
will still face greater time pressures and probably lower quality briefing than would an
appellate court.").
143 Professor Caminker observes that district courts could do so even without increased funding by simply restructuring their dockets. Id.
144 Id at 849 (observing that "superior court proficiency does not provide a universally applicable nor particularly strong justification for the doctrine of hierarchical precedent").
145 See Schauer, 94 Va L Rev at 1946-47 (cited in note 123) (characterizing as "optional authorities" for courts of one circuit the decisions of another circuit).
146 See Caminker, 46 Stan L Rev at 822 (cited in note 102).
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law.147 This suggestion is also made more plausible by the fact
that political authority in general may be based on the coordination benefits that derive from having uniform rules of application.148
Thus, whether evidence impeaching the decision of a superior court is properly considered by a lower court depends on how
much work the epistemic or integrity rationales do in justifying
the practice of vertical precedent. To the extent that those rationales do not do much work and that, instead, the practice is
grounded primarily on rule-of-law values, evidence offered to
impeach the decision of a superior court should not be considered by lower courts.
B.

Common Law Stare Decisis

At common law, the doctrine of stare decisis, or horizontal
precedent, instructs courts to follow the holdings of past courts
of the same level.149 Impeaching evidence probably is appropriate
for a court to consider here because all of the conditions mentioned in the last Part hold: (1) past decisions are only presumptively binding at common law, (2) the most plausible rationales
for much of the practice include the epistemic-deference and integrity rationales, and (3) courts are not precluded from looking
to the rationale for stare decisis in deciding how to treat past
decisions.
The first condition is clearly met. It is widely recognized
that stare decisis does not impose an absolute obligation on
courts to follow past decisions. Rather, it is often said that
courts require a "special justification" beyond the mere incorrectness of a precedent, to overrule it.150 Thus, unlike with verti147 Id at 850-53. See also Perry, 7 Oxford J Legal Stud at 244 (cited in note 90)
("That lower courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts in a strong exclusionary
sense can easily be explained by a general requirement of institutional consistency.").
148 See Joseph Raz, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, 90
Minn L Rev 1003, 1031 (2006) ("A major, if not the main, factor in establishing the legitimacy of political authorities is their ability to secure coordination.").
149 The full Latin phrase from which the term derives is "stare decisis, et non quieta
movere" or "[aldhere to the decisions and do not unsettle things which are established."
Frank, Courts on Trialat 266 (cited in note 90) (quotation marks omitted).
150 Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at 60 (cited in note 97) (comparing different
formulations, including the "special justification" language, of the burden of justification
required to overturn precedent and observing that such "modifiers [I make clear that the
principle of stare decisis becomes meaningless if a court feels free to overrule all of those
previous decisions it believes to be wrong"); Perry, 7 Oxford J Legal Stud at 240 (cited in
note 90) (explaining that the common law judge is not bound by rules but that her reasons for departing from precedent on a given issue require the judge to be persuaded
"above a threshold of strength which is higher than what would be required on the
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cal precedent, even when a court is faced with a case on all fours
with a previous decision, the practice authorizes it to consider
whether the circumstances are such that the prior decision
ought not control the present case.
The second condition requires more explanation. Undoubtedly, the ability of stare decisis to foster rule-of-law values plays
a role in explaining the virtue of stare decisis.161 But it is far less
clear than in the case of vertical precedent that those values are
alone sufficient to justify the practice. This is so partly because
the presumptive quality of the precedential obligation that stare
decisis imposes vindicates rule-of-law values so much less effectively.152 Not only are common law courts able to overrule their
own past decisions in exceptional circumstances, but they are
also understood to have considerable flexibility in expanding
rules, reinterpreting past holdings by making reference to their
underlying rationales, and sometimes offering entirely new rationales for previous decisions153 Such practices mean that
courts will often reach decisions that the parties likely could not
have predicted beforehand and thus undermine, rather than foster, legal predictability.154
Moreover, when common law courts reinterpret past decisions, and sometimes a whole series of them, they do so in order
ordinary balance of reasons"). An older tradition of precedent in the United States had
an even weaker notion of precedential authority. If a past case was clearly in error, this
view held that "the decision should be overruled unless there was some special reason to
adhere to it." Nelson, 87 Va L Rev at 4-5 (cited in note 96).
151 See Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at 43 (cited in note 97) (explaining that the
practice of stare decisis "serves a range of values all having something to do with stability"); Frank, Courts on Trial at 268-71 (cited in note 90) (observing that arguments related to the rule of law and stability are commonly offered to justify stare decisis).
152 See Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 40-42 (cited in note 90) (observing that interpretations of precedent that require courts only to follow the results of past decisions do
not serve rule-of-law values particularly well).
153 See Moore, Precedent,Induction, and Ethical Generalizationat 185 (cited in note
131) (criticizing a strictly rule-based interpretation of common law practice on the
ground that it does not square with "the freedom exercised by subsequent courts to reformulate the holding of a case, making it broader or narrower than that stated by the
deciding court"); Perry, 7 Oxford J Legal Stud at 239 (cited in note 90) (observing that at
common law "the process of reassessing the reasoning in previous cases sometimes takes
a more radical form than mere restriction or extension, amounting to what is, in effect,
the articulation of a new justificatory basis for a whole line of prior decisions"); Dworkin,
Rights at 119 (cited in note 98) ("It may be, however, that the new principle strikes out
on a different line, so that it justifies a precedent or a series of precedents on grounds
very different from what their opinions propose.").
154 See Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer at 114 (cited in note 97) (discussing the
"problem of retroactivity" as one of the "curious implications" of the way common law
rules change).
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to develop the law or change it incrementally. So the question is,
on what ground could common law courts use previous decisions
as a source from which to develop new rules of decision? Statutes that change the law presumably derive their legitimacy
from the fact that their members have been democratically
elected, but past courts have no more democratic legitimacy
than present courts. Nor do past courts possess a particular expertise that current courts do not possess in a way that an administrative agency might. What is required, then, is some explanation for why it is rational to develop the law using a
method so wedded to the past. 55
Of those we have considered, only the epistemic and integrity rationales are likely to fit the bill. Consider first the epistemic
rationale. Here, as already noted, the argument is based on a
56
But one problem
general deference to the wisdom of the past.1
with this view is that it is hardly obvious that past courts are
any wiser than present-day courts. Indeed, if anything, one
might think that present courts have an epistemic advantage
over previous courts because they have seen more cases and
thus have more experience.57
For this reason, the epistemic rationale for following precedent may depend on the further assumption that past courts
stand in an epistemically privileged position with respect to
moral features relevant to the dispute with which they were confronted.158 It assumes, in other words, that Oliver Wendell
Holmes was right when he said that it is a "merit of the common
law that it decides the case first and determines the principle

s55
See Lyons, 38 Vand L Rev at 508 (cited in note 90) (arguing that in order to justify the practice of precedent, one needs to explain the "conservative bias" inherent in it,
and further arguing that this cannot be done). Of course, it is possible that this method
of developing the law is not rational. See Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 40-42 (cited in
note 90) (arguing that such a process offers neither the rule-of-law benefits that stricter
interpretations of precedent offer nor the moral benefits of a practice in which past decisions do not bind at all); Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: ConcerningPrijudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 Colum L Rev 199, 201 (1933) ("To say that a court reaches a conclusion partly because it is following a precedent and partly because the conclusion is
just, is really impossible."). However, my analysis proceeds on the assumption that it is
rational and seeks to explain why.
156 See notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
157 See Nelson, 87 Va L Rev at 57-58 (cited in note 96) (offering several reasons why
later courts might be more likely to make correct legal judgments than previous courts).
1ss See Oliphant, 14 ABA J at 159 (cited in note 90) (suggesting that the results of
past cases are justifiably treated as authoritative on the ground that judges have an "intuition of fitness of solution to problem").
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afterwards."169 The rules and principles that courts generate
when deciding cases are understood to be courts' best efforts at
explaining by means of a generalization the result that they
reach mostly by relying on background legal principles and their
own moral intuition based on particular, morally salient facts.16o
The integrity rationale, meanwhile, provides a slightly different answer. Here the claim is (again analogizing a political
community to an individual person) that the virtue of integrity
entails a duty to take seriously one's own past commitments,
ideals, or projects. Thus, insofar as the past decisions of a court
represent the judgments of a community's past self, they deserve
a certain degree of respect and carry normative force simply by
virtue of having been decided and irrespective of the content of
the rules and principles they generate.161
For reasons already discussed, impeaching evidence is relevant to a court's decision of whether to follow precedent under
159 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 Am L Rev 1, 1
(1870). But see Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U Chi L Rev 883, 890901 (2006) (arguing that judges may be prone to cognitive errors when making policy decisions based on a set of concrete facts before them).
160 This rationale also explains the doctrine according to which only a court's holding (rather than its dicta) binds future courts. For the doctrine presumes that the prior
court devoted more substantial attention to its holding than to its speculative ideas
about how other cases should be treated. See Cohens v Virginia, 19 US 264, 399-400
(1821) (explaining why holdings bind courts more strongly than dicta on the ground that
"[t]he question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its
full extent" and that although "[o]ther principles which may serve to illustrate it, are
considered in their relation to the case decided, [] their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated").
161 See Postema, 36 McGill L Rev at 1177-78 (cited in note 90) (arguing that the
"moral force of precedent" lies in the "duty of loyalty" communities have to their past
commitments); Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time at 189 (cited in note 116) (arguing that the
common law style of adjudication is the means by which the judiciary, by "holding certain results more or less constant, gives meaning to legal and political commitments over
time"); Hershovitz, Exploring Law's Empire at 114 (cited in note 94) ("Integrity requires
a commitment to a moral view, and one can only display a commitment to a moral view
by a pattern of behavior across time. Constantly shifting moral views are a sign of caprice, not integrity."). Interestingly, it is not clear whether Professor Dworkin, with
whom the value of integrity in law is most closely associated, understands the concept as
entailing a requirement to maintain consistency with past cases. On the one hand, his
analogy to personal integrity suggests such a commitment since the concept in that area
typically includes a temporal dimension. It also finds some textual support in his suggestion that Germans today rightly feel a sense of obligation to Jews as a result of the
crimes the Nazi regime inflicted against them. See Dworkin, Law's Empire at 172 (cited
in note 86). On the other hand, Dworkin insists that integrity "commands a horizontal
rather than vertical consistency of principle across the range of the legal standards the
community now enforces" and does not "require that judges try to understand the law
they enforce as continuous in principle with the abandoned law of a previous century or
even a previous generation." Id at 227.
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both the epistemic and integrity rationales. Therefore, as long as
the third condition is met, so that courts are authorized to make
reference to those rationales in their decision of whether to accord precedential weight to a past decision, then impeaching evidence will be relevant to a common law court's stare decisis
analysis. That condition seems easily met since the common law
does not narrowly cabin the grounds on which a court may base
its evaluation of precedent, and consideration of such issues is a
natural and plausible basis for deciding how much weight to accord a past decision.162
C.

Constitutional Stare Decisis

The proper role of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication is deeply controversial and the subject of intense scholarly
debate.163 The controversy stems in part from the fact that stare
decisis seems to authorize the Supreme Court to uphold past decisions, such as Miranda v Arizona64 and Roe, which remain
substantively controversial and which the Court has acknowledged

162 It may be worth saying a word about the role of stare decisis in the context of
statutory interpretation. It is often said that a court's interpretation of a statute ought to
bind future courts more strongly than do common law or constitutional decisions. See
William N. Eskridge Jr, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Georgetown L J 1361,
1364-65 (1988). However, the justification for doing so is not obvious; nor is it clear how
faithfully the Supreme Court actually applies such a "super-strong presumption" against
overruling statutory precedents. Id at 1364 (criticizing the rule and noting its "shaky"
precedential support and "uneven development and application"). A common justification
is that the legislature can overrule the court's decisions, id at 1366-67, but of course that
is true of common law decisions as well. Thus, the analysis of impeaching evidence in
this Section would seem to apply equally well to precedents interpreting statutes.
163 For a useful summary and taxonomy of the debate about constitutional precedent, see David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Introspection, 86 Tex L Rev 929, 930-40 (2008). See generally John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalismand Precedent, 103 Nw U L Rev 803 (2009);
Richard H. Fallon Jr, ConstitutionalPrecedent Viewed through the Lens of HartianPositivist Jurisprudence,86 NC L Rev 1107 (2008); Nelson, 87 Va L Rev 1 (cited in note 96);
Harrison, 50 Duke L J 503 (cited in note 101); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare
Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey?, 109
Yale L J 1535 (2000); Hellman, 37 Ariz L Rev 1107 (cited in note 89); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum L Rev 723 (1988). Despite this scholarship, there is still a sense among some that the proper role of stare decisis in constitutional interpretation has not yet been persuasively established. See, for
example, James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 Va L Rev 1523, 1570 (2011) (observing that for the purposes of advancing constitutional theory, "[w]ork that establishes the proper scope of stare decisis would be
invaluable").
164 384 US 436 (1966).
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may be erroneous.165 Thus, whether following precedent in certain cases is even constitutional is a live issue among constitutional theorists in a way that it is not in the other contexts
considered.
Nevertheless, the same considerations already discussed recur at the level of constitutional adjudication. Whether evidence
impeaching a past decision is properly relevant to the Court's
analysis depends on both the proper rationale for, and model of,
precedent. In the constitutional context, the debate tends to be
limited to whether past decisions ought to bind the present
Court presumptively or not at all.
Under some theories of constitutional interpretation, the
Court's precedent should play little if any role in determining
the outcome of cases that the present Court must decide. Some
originalists, for instance, argue that insofar as a precedent is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution it is
improper-perhaps even unconstitutional-to accord it any
precedential weight at all.166 At the same time, the "moral reading" of the Constitution endorsed by Professor Ronald Dworkin,
though in some ways diametrically opposed to originalism,
treats precedent in a similar way. This view understands the
Constitution as embodying important principles of political morality, such as the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection under the laws or the First Amendment's right of free
speech.167 The justice's task is thus "to find the best conception of
constitutional moral principles-the best understanding of what
165 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Stare Decisis and the Constitution:An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 NYU L Rev 570, 571 (2001) ("[The Supreme Court has suggested that its reaffirmations of such landmark decisions as Roe v. Wade and Mirandav.
Arizona rested on stare decisis, not an endorsement of the original holdings' correctness."). See also Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 443 (2000) ("Whether or not we
would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the
issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling
it now."); Casey, 505 US at 854-69 (engaging in an extensive stare decisis analysis in
order to justify affirming Roe).
166 See, for example, Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case against Precedent, 17
Harv J L & Pub Pol 23, 27-28 (1994) (arguing that treating an erroneous past constitutional decision as binding is unconstitutional); Paulsen, 109 Yale L J at 1596 (cited in
note 163) (arguing that stare decisis is only a judicial "policy" that is not constitutionally
authorized and that can be overruled by congressional statute).
167 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 7 (Harvard 1996) ("According to the moral reading, . . [broadly worded constitutional provisions] must be understood in the way their language most naturally suggests:
they refer to abstract moral principles and incorporate these by reference, as limits on
government's power.").
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equal moral status for men and women really requires, for example-that fits the broad story of America's historical record."168 In other words, it seems that under Professor Dworkin's
theory of constitutional adjudication, the Court ought to reach
the best decision on the merits, irrespective of whether there is a
conflicting prior decision on point. For that reason, scholars have
criticized Professor Dworkin for giving insufficient weight to the
role of stare decisis in his theory of constitutional interpretation.169
For the reasons discussed in Part II it is not clear why evidence impeaching a past decision would be relevant to the
Court's inquiry on these views. According to each of these views,
the Court is primarily obligated to enforce its best understanding of the constitutional text itself rather than the Court's case
law interpreting it. Thus, for instance, under the moral reading,
the only issue in Seminole Tribe would be whether the Hans decision was consistent with the best interpretation of the principle of sovereign immunity expressed in the Eleventh Amendment. Or in Mitchell, under a strictly originalist approach, the
only issue would be whether Hunt was consistent with the original understanding of the Establishment Clause. In neither case
should it matter one way or the other what best explains, as a
historical matter, why the previous decision came out the way it
did. 170

The same conclusion follows if the Court's past decisions are
presumptively binding on it but only for rule-of-law reasons.
Once again, this view is consistent with otherwise quite different constitutional theories. One can be an originalist and yet
still think that some precedents warrant respect simply because
they have become so entrenched in practice that to overrule
them would be to upset political stability.171 Or one could believe
Id at 11.
See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev 1, 69 (1985) (observing that under either originalist or
Dworkinian theories of constitutional interpretation, judicial precedent-the most important tool of the constitutional lawyer-drops from sight"); Fallon, 76 NYU L Rev at
577 n 27 (cited in note 165) ("Proposals to reduce or eliminate the force of constitutional
stare decisis need not necessarily identify constitutional 'meaning' with the original understanding. For example, it would be possible to equate constitutional meaning with the
best 'moral reading' of constitutional language.").
170 See Dworkin, Law's Empire at 227 (cited in note 86) (observing that his theory of
law "begins in the present and pursues the past only so far as and in the way its contemporary focus dictates").
171 See, for example, Bork, The Tempting of America at 159 (cited in note 35) (arguing that "those who adhere to a philosophy of original understanding are more likely to
168
169
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that the Court should rely primarily on its own precedent, rather than the Constitution's original meaning, but for largely
the same rule-of-law reasons.'72 In either case, it is not obvious
why impeaching evidence would be relevant to the inquiry since
any reliance interests that have accrued have done so irrespective of what justified the past court's holding. And the same is
true of arguments from political stability, predictability, limits
on judicial discretion, or formal equality.
The situation is otherwise under theories that endorse a
version of common law constitutionalism based on either epistemic-deference or integrity rationales. The epistemic version
sees stare decisis as a valuable method of developing constitutional law in a way analogous to how it works at common law.173
It presumes that the Court's past decisions are correct but authorizes the present Court to make incremental changes to previous holdings in light of the new concrete factual situations it
confronts. This view reflects the Burkean impulse that such a
respect precedent than those who do not" on the ground that they are apt to care more
about the value of political stability); McGinnis and Rappaport, 103 Nw U L Rev at 835
(cited in note 163) (arguing that the Supreme Court should adhere to precedent when
the decision has become sufficiently entrenched that the costs of overruling it would
outweigh the benefits of doing so).
172 These benefits of stare decisis are emphasized in Fallon, 76 NYU L Rev at 58285 (cited in note 165), and in Monaghan, 88 Colum L Rev at 744-48 (cited in note 163).
See also Shapiro, 86 Tex L Rev at 935 & nn 23-24 (cited in note 163) (citing Fallon and
Monaghan as scholars who emphasize the need for stability and continuity in political
institutions).
173 See, for example, Strauss, The Living Constitution at 37-38 (cited in note 103)
(arguing that the authority of constitutional law stems from its "evolutionary origins and
its general acceptability to successive generations"); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 NC L Rev 619,
688, 691-92 (1994) (endorsing a theory of constitutional interpretation that relies heavily on precedent and "heeds Burke's suggestion that 'instead of exploding general prejudices,' we would do better to endeavor 'to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in
them'), quoting Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France,in Paul Langford, ed, The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke: Volume VIII: The French Revolution 1790-1794 53, 138 (Clarendon 1989); Shapiro, 86 Tex L Rev at 942 (cited in note
163):
[P]erhaps my principal reason for finding the doctrine [of stare decisis] a congenial one lies in my own Burkean approach to the world in general and to law
in particular. The value that I place on tradition derives . . . from a conviction
that individuals, and here I include myself at the head of the list, are likely to
overrate their own rationality, wisdom, or judgment.
Merrill, 19 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 519-21 (cited in note 103) (arguing that conservatives
should prefer an approach to constitutional interpretation that recognizes a larger role
for precedent than originalism allows on the ground that conservatives tend to be
properly "skeptical about the power of human reason to reorder society in accordance
with some overarching rational plan").
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process offers a wiser and more prudent means of developing the
law than most alternatives. On this view, impeaching evidence
would be relevant because it would give grounds for thinking
that the presumption of correctness underlying this process may
not in fact apply in a particular case.
Meantime, the constitutional-integrity rationale for following past decisions, just like its common law analogue, emphasizes the way in which the Court's own past efforts to interpret the
principles contained in the Constitution represent commitments
which are themselves expressions of a kind of democratic will.174
Under this view, since these commitments are supposed to be
grounded in principle, evidence suggesting that a particular
Court was unconcerned with such principles in a given case, and
was instead bowing to political pressure or giving expression to
an irrational prejudice, would again be evidence relevant to the
present Court's decision of whether to fulfill its duty to remain
faithful to the previous decision.
But despite the widespread debate among constitutional
theorists over how the Supreme Court ought to treat its own
past decisions, most scholars agree that, as a descriptive matter,
the Supreme Court acts like a common law court, drawing heavily on precedent in its constitutional analysis.7- Thus, it is hardly any surprise that the Court's most determined originalists,
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, both signed on to
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Seminole Tribe, which offered the standard epistemic-deference rationale for deferring to

174 See Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time at 189 (cited in note 116) (arguing that the
"ultimate basis of the doctrine of stare decisis in constitutional law" lies in the way in
which it allows the political community to make and keep commitments over time). Although I earlier noted, see note 161, that in Law's Empire Professor Dworkin suggests
that integrity does not require consistency over time, in Freedom's Law he suggests that
the Casey Court properly upheld Roe on the ground that the Justices must be constrained by a "respect for the integrity of its decisions over time" if it is to be "understood
as an institution of law and not just another venue for politics." Dworkin, Freedom's Law
at 117-25 (cited in note 167).
175 See Lawson, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 33 (cited in note 166) ("The doctrine of
precedent is too deeply ingrained in the legal system to permit serious inquiry into its
own legitimacy."); Ryan, 97 Va L Rev at 1557 (cited in note 163) ("The Supreme Court
undoubtedly acts like a common-law court insofar as it most often relies on past precedent to guide current decisions."); Monaghan, 88 Colum L Rev at 727-41 (cited in note
163) (arguing that vast areas of constitutional doctrine cannot be squared with an original understanding of the relevant constitutional provisions and that the best way to understand this is as a product of the Court following stare decisis); Strauss, The Living
Constitution at 33 (cited in note 103) (observing that in any given Supreme Court case,
"[m]ost of the real work [is] done by the Court's analysis of its previous decisions").
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the Court's decision in Hans.176 Justice Scalia also joined Justice
Thomas's opinion condemning Hunt as an expression of antiCatholic bigotry.'" Neither of these arguments would be relevant to the constitutional issues involved if the only reason to
depart from the Constitution's original understanding were for
rule-of-law reasons. But they are consistent with a view of the
Court, according to which it acts as common law court in the area of constitutional adjudication, using past decisions to develop
the law on the basis of either integrity or epistemic-deference rationales. Such facts suggest that, as with the common law, the
rule-of-law benefits associated with stare decisis do not alone
explain that doctrine's role in constitutional law.
IV. OBJECTIONS

The argument so far has sought to establish that under certain circumstances historical evidence that impeaches a past decision-that is, evidence that bears on whether the decision was
motivated by "extralegal" considerations-is relevant to a court's
analysis of precedent. But even if, in theory, such evidence is
relevant to the issue a court confronts under some rationales for
following precedent, excluding such arguments may still be justified if allowing lawyers to employ them in court would incur
burdensome administrative costs or would undermine legitimate
judicial policies. Below I consider some specific objections along
these lines and suggest why they may not be as persuasive as
they first appear.
A.

Impeaching Evidence Wastes Time and Is Susceptible to
Abuse

First, it might be argued that the historical evidence on
which impeaching arguments are premised will often point in
different directions and will therefore be insufficiently determinative of the issues on which it is brought to bear.178 This overabundance of historical materials both makes it susceptible to
abuse by judges and threatens to waste judges' and lawyers'
Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 54, 64.
Mitchell, 530 US at 828-29.
Professor John Orth's historical explanation of Hans, for instance, has not gone
unchallenged. See, for example, Michael G. Collins, Book Review, The Conspiracy Theory
of the Eleventh Amendment, 88 Colum L Rev 212, 229-34 (1988) (reviewing Orth's book
and suggesting that Supreme Court doctrine likely helps explain the Hans Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment more than Orth acknowledged).
176
177
178
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time.17s The problem is further aggravated by the fact that such
historical inquiry is conducted by lawyers, who are not known
for being very good historians.180
The concern is a reasonable one, but it is worth asking what
the relevant comparison ought to be. After all, at least in the
constitutional domain, adjudication already invites fairly extensive historical inquiry, due in large part to the rise in popularity
of originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation. These
days, even those justices who are not otherwise wedded to that
theory often feel the need to meet originalists' arguments with
historical arguments of their own.181 Furthermore, the argument
applies equally to nonimpeaching uses of history to evaluate
precedents, such as those already discussed.182 In other words, to
borrow a phrase from evidence law, originalism has already
opened the door to historical inquiry, so it may be a little late to
try to shut it now.183
B.

Impeaching Evidence Undermines the Rule of Law

Another reason to exclude such evidence is a stronger version of the objection just mentioned. The problem with allowing
historical evidence about the true basis for decisions is not merely that it wastes time but that it undermines the rule of law by
rendering the law deeply indeterminate. Because virtually any
decision would be potentially vulnerable to impeachment, and
because it is rarely possible to establish conclusively why a court
179 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 36
(Princeton 1997) (observing that if courts were to stop relying on legislative history, then
"[j]udges, lawyers, and clients will be saved an enormous amount of time and expense").
180 See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 Const Commen 271, 282 (2005) ("Very few lawyers or judges have the
skills of a professional historian seeking to imaginatively reconstruct the past.");
Strauss, The Living Constitution at 20 (cited in note 103) ("When historical materials are
vague or confused, as they routinely will be, there is an overwhelming temptation for a
judge to see in them what the judge wants to see in them.").
181 See, for example, District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 639-82 (2008) (Stevens dissenting) (observing that "[e]ven if the textual and historical arguments on both
sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our
predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself, would prevent most jurists from
endorsing .. . [the Court's] dramatic upheaval in the law," but then engaging in a
lengthy historical analysis of the original meaning of the Second Amendment) (citation
omitted).
182 See Part IA-C.
183 See FRE 404(a)(2)(B) (providing that the defendant's attack on the victim's character trait will open the door to the prosecutor attacking the defendant's same character
trait).
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decided the way it did, people would have little sense of how
courts would interpret the case law and therefore little idea of
what the law is on a given legal issue.
Again, this is a powerful objection, but one less persuasive
once we pull it apart. To begin with, we must distinguish between metaphysical and epistemic versions of this objection. As
a metaphysical claim, this objection must assert that the law is
determinate now but would be indeterminate if precedential authority were permitted to be attacked in this way. But there is
little reason to think that is true. To begin with, it may well be
the case that the law, at least in many areas, including constitutional law, is not determinate now, in which case the premise of
the objection is false. Even if it is determinate in some areas,
however, the objection must show why permitting evidence that
bears on the sincerity of a past court's reasoning would render it
indeterminate.
The intuition might be that the essential causal question
involved-Why did the court decide the case the way it did?does not yield a determinate answer because the but-for causes
of such a decision are literally infinite. That intuition is sound,
but it misunderstands the nature of the question courts must
answer. In those cases where impeaching evidence is relevant,
courts must decide whether to treat a particular case as an authority-that is, they must decide either (depending on the rationale) to defer to that court's judgment about the relevant legal issue (epistemic rationale) or to remain faithful to that
court's judgment about the issue (integrity rationale). Either
way, the question a court must answer is a normative questionin the broad sense of one that is responsive to evaluative criteria, either of rationality or of political morality. It need not answer the metaphysical question about causation at all.1s4
As an epistemic claim, however, this rationale for exclusion
has more force. For even if the law in some areas is determinate
and would remain so while inviting impeaching evidence, it may
still be the case that allowing such evidence in, simply by virtue
of having added more variables to the analysis, makes it more
184 Of course, one might respond that it is impossible to give a rational judgment
about something if the judgment depends on assuming the truth of an assertion that has
no determinate truth value. But that charge applies with equal force to conventional legal reasoning about issues as to which there is arguably no metaphysically determinate
answer. See Brian Leiter, Law and Objectivity, in Coleman and Shapiro, eds, Jurisprudence & Philosophy of the Law 969, 977-79 (cited in note 75).
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difficult to make conclusive arguments that settle disagreements.185 But so framed, this objection invites the same response
as the one offered earlier: As compared to what? Adjudicationparticularly constitutional adjudication, but not only there-is
already rife with deep and pervasive disagreement, reflected in
the frequent splits on the Supreme Court, about what counts as
valid sources of law and methods of interpretation. It is rife, in
other words, with what Professor Dworkin calls "theoretical disagreement."186 So it is difficult to see why adding one more
means of analyzing a precedent would effect a sea change in the
relative determinacy of the law.
C.

Impeaching Evidence Undermines the Legitimacy of Courts

A third objection expresses a concern for the reputation of
courts, particularly that of the Supreme Court. Even if lawyers
and judges might recognize that previous decisions are less authoritative for having been based on "extralegal" considerations,
to state as much explicitly would be to undermine the Court's
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Under this view, the problem with such arguments is that their use does a disservice not
so much to the "traditional method of adjudication," as Chief
Justice Rehnquist suggested in Seminole Tribe,187 but rather to
the Court's reputation for employing such a traditional method
of adjudication.188

At first blush, such a concern with reputation may not seem
like a very noble policy basis, especially to the extent that it entails obscuring uncomfortable facts. But there may be good reasons for it. Professor Deborah Hellman has argued, for instance,
that the Supreme Court quite properly considers whether its decision will appear principled because maintaining such an appearance is important for ensuring general compliance with its
decisions, and without such general compliance the Court could
not enforce any of its judgments in a legitimate manner. 89 Indeed, the Court has suggested that the practice of stare decisis
185 See Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism at 277 (cited in note 83) (distinguishing between indeterminate and inconclusive legal reasons).
186 Dworkin, Law's Empire at 4-5 (cited in note 86).
187 Seminole Tribe of Florida,517 US at 68-69 (criticizing the dissent for its "undocumented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of the decision in Hans").
188 Baker v Carr,369 US 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter dissenting).
189 Hellman, 37 Ariz L Rev at 1121-23 (cited in note 89). See generally Adam M.
Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 Harv L Rev 1563 (2012) (analyzing
more generally policy arguments based on appearance).

1676

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:1625

itself is justified partly on this ground.190 So the argument here
might be that even if impeaching evidence may be technically
relevant to the Court's analysis in some cases, the risk of harm
that could be caused by admitting it is so great that the Court is
justified in categorically excluding it.
This objection strikes me as the most persuasive reason to
exclude impeaching evidence, but two points reduce its power.
First, broadening the scope of legal argument to include impeaching evidence may actually strengthen the Court's reputation, rather than weaken it. By shining a spotlight on the instances in which the Court has fallen short of its commitment to
decide cases according to legal principles, such arguments imply
that in the mine run of cases, the Court does decide cases in a
principled manner. And by demonstrating a willingness to own
up to past mistakes when it fails by its own standards, the Court
arguably betrays more strength than weakness.
Second, even if this is a persuasive reason to exclude some
sorts of impeaching evidence, it does not necessarily justify a per
se rule of exclusion. For one thing, some sorts of explanations
likely undermine the Court's legitimacy more than others. Indeed, as already mentioned, one irony of the debate between
Justice Souter and the majority in Seminole Tribe is that the
"extralegal" explanation Justice Souter offered-that the Court
was concerned with its capacity to enforce its judgment against
the state of Louisiana-is, under some views, not even extralegal at all. The rationale would be that the court quite permissibly took into account its capacity to enforce its judgments because doing so helped preserve the perceived power, and hence
legitimacy, of the Court. So even if the policy rationale is valid it
does not follow that all "extralegal" explanations of past decisions inflict the same degree of reputational harm. In fact, considering it in this case would have the further benefit of raising
the important question of whether it is proper for the Court to
take such institutional considerations into account when deciding cases.

190 Casey, 505 US at 865-66:

The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept
its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such,
no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.
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Impeaching Evidence Yields No Workable Rules

The above response also provides a basis for replying to a final objection sounding in judicial policy. It might be argued that
even if impeaching evidence is relevant and even if it would not
undermine the rule of law or the perceived legitimacy of courts,
it should nevertheless still not be considered by courts because it
is not susceptible to resolution by clear rules for determining exactly what kind of evidence impeaches a decision or how much
evidence would be sufficient to deprive a decision of its precedential status. It would thus produce a flood of meritless arguments that courts would have difficulty evaluating.191
Again, the concern is reasonable, but the conclusion hasty.
Although there are currently no rules governing the treatment
of impeaching evidence, that is largely because such arguments
have gone unrecognized as a valid form of argument and so have
not prompted any efforts to craft legal doctrine around them.
But one could imagine various different rules that might cabin
and constrain the kinds of arguments available without banning
them altogether. For instance, courts could ban the use of such
arguments about particularly recent decisions-say, about those
decided in the last twenty years-on the theory that a certain
degree of critical distance is required before one can make considered judgments about what best explains a decision. Doing so
might help respond to the legitimacy objection already mentioned.192 As for the relevant burden of proof, courts could develop doctrinal tests, analogous to standards of review, for establishing how persuasive impeaching historical evidence must be
before a precedent is considered sapped of authority.e3 Finally,
lest any doubt remain about the possibility for crafting rules
governing impeachment, one only has to look to the rules of
191 See Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Co, 129 S Ct 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts dissenting) ('The Court's new 'rule' provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when
recusal will be constitutionally required. This will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be.").
192 Indeed, as Professor Hellman observes, overruling recent precedents at allnever mind the reason for doing so-may itself do harm to the Court's reputation. Hellman, 37 Ariz L Rev at 1111 (cited in note 89).
193 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837,
843 (1984) (holding that when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its authorizing
statute, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," then the
court must ask whether the agency's interpretation is "a permissible construction of the
statute"). See also Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw U L Rev 859, 896-98 (1992)
(suggesting that there may be a role for explicit burdens of proof, analogous to those used
in the fact-finding context, in courts' interpretations of questions of law).
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evidence to see that there is no shortage of ways of delimiting
the precise nature and scope that impeaching arguments can
take.194

In short, the prospect of admitting impeaching evidence
raises a variety of legitimate concerns bearing on its administrability and other judicial policies. But these concerns are
hardly new ones. Courts have long had to figure out creative
ways to handle history, appropriate ways to maintain the legitimacy of courts, and practical ways to craft new rules in uncharted domains. Impeaching evidence thus does not present a
new or radical challenge to traditional adjudication.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been relatively modest. I cannot
claim to have shown that adjudication, whether in the constitutional context or any other, would be fairer, more efficient, or
more accurate if courts standardly allowed lawyers to make impeaching arguments of the sort laid out in the Introduction. Rather, I hope to have shown merely that in both the common law
and constitutional domains historical evidence suggesting that a
previous court based its decision on "extralegal" considerations
may very well be rationally relevant to the question a present
court faces when it considers whether, and if so how, to accord
precedential weight to that past decision. Nor are the policy reasons offered to exclude such arguments particularly persuasive
since they would condemn practices we already consider normal
and proper.
The hope is that contemplating this possibility is profitable
for both practical and theoretical reasons. As a practical matter,
the analysis offered here might enable lawyers and historians to
better frame the way in which they present historical evidence
about past decisions to courts. As noted at the outset, the amici
in Hamdan had no persuasive doctrinal hook-let alone a theoretical framework-that would enable them to connect up the
194 See, for example, FRE 608 (specifying the acceptable forms of impeachment evidence based on character and the specific character traits to which the evidence must
pertain); FRE 609 (detailing precisely which kinds of criminal convictions may be introduced to impeach a witness); FRE 613 (establishing procedures for the introduction of
prior inconsistent statements used to impeach a witness).
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historical facts they unearthed about Quirin with the Court's
traditional stare decisis inquiry. Recognizing that not only is
there some-albeit minimal-precedent for the use of such impeaching arguments by the justices themselves, but also that
there is a theoretically coherent justification for their use, may
thus be of some assistance to future litigants and amici curiae.
As a theoretical matter-and here I limit my speculations to
the constitutional domain, where I consider them most plausible-I hope my analysis reveals how much broader our conception of constitutional interpretation could be. Constitutional
theorists and historians perpetually argue about how best to
understand the Supreme Court's past decisions and doctrines:
Do they systematically bend doctrine to respond to social or political pressures?95 Do they reflect principled application of the
relevant doctrine at the time?196 Or did that doctrine itself incorporate ideological assumptions?197 But those debates often proceed on the assumption that, though perhaps important for how
we think of constitutional law generally, the answers to such
questions do not bear on how the Court should use those decisions to decide cases. 98 The arguments are historical, not legal.

195 See, for example, Klarman, Jim Crow at 5 (cited in note 29) ("This book argues
that because constitutional law is generally quite indeterminate, constitutional interpretation almost inevitably reflects the broader social and political context of the times.").
196 See, for example, David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against Progressive Reform 3 (Chicago 2011) (defending the Court's decision in Lochner on the ground that "the liberty of contract doctrine was grounded in
precedent and the venerable natural rights tradition").
197 See, for example, Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law
1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 9 (Oxford 1992) (arguing that the history of
American law generally, including constitutional law specifically, reflects a "central aspiration of American legal thinkers" to separate law from politics, which in much of the
country's history has taken the form of categorical or conceptual thinking).
198 See, for example, Klarman, Jim Crow at 5 (cited in note 29) ("This book makes
no claim about how judges should decide cases."); Bernstein, RehabilitatingLochner at 6
(cited in note 196):
History is also inherently agnostic on the soundness of such modern outgrowths of Lochner and other liberty of contract cases as the incorporation of
most of the Bill of Rights against the states via the Due Process Clause, the
protection of unenumerated individual rights in cases like Griswold and Lawrence v. Texas, or other manifestations of what is known today as substantive
due process. I do not, therefore, reach any conclusions on these issues.
Horwitz, Transformationat 271-72 (cited in note 197) (criticizing the effort by legal theorists from the past to generalize abstract truths from particular moral and social controversies but suggesting as a cure only that legal thinkers adopt a pragmatic attitude
that acknowledges the interrelation of law and politics and does not "deny, even to itself,
its own political and moral choices").
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Of course, for strict originalists that assumption is justified
since the relevance of the Court's precedent to constitutional interpretation is already only secondary. But for those who
acknowledge or embrace the Court's common law approach to
constitutional adjudication, there is no reason why historicist interpretations that explain away whole lines of the Court's past
doctrine as a product of social, political, or economic forces could
not be central to its interpretive approach.'99
It is tempting to dismiss such an approach as profoundly
misguided on the ground that it ignores, in Professor Dworkin's
phrase, "the internal character of legal argument" and that it instead wrongly pursues "supposedly larger questions of history
and society."200 But that objection begs the essential question

since what is in dispute is precisely the character of legal argument. And what this Article has attempted to show is that insofar as law is a practice based on sources of authority, the considerations that motivated that authority's statements or actionswhether in the context of fact-finding or that of interpreting case
law-are rationally relevant to the decision of whether to continue treating that source as an authority.
The point is thus crucially not that legal reasoning could or
should ever lose its formal or "artificial" character and become
indistinguishable from legal history.201 It neither can nor should.
The point is rather that nothing about the highly structured, artificial--even fictionalized-character of legal reasoning necessarily entails that the Court adopt a method that looks only to
internal reasons, rather than to external causes. Instead, it is
perfectly consistent with an approach that understands the development of constitutional law as the story of a Court perpetually

199 Professor Jack M. Balkin's "living originalism" would seem to be such an effort to
fuse external legal history with constitutional theory since he argues that the way in
which constitutional doctrine has responded to the social and political movements of the
past gives it a certain kind of democratic legitimacy. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Belknap 2011). However, on closer examination, it is not so clear, for
Professor Balkin clarifies that his theory "does not give detailed normative advice about
how to decide particular cases but instead explains how constitutional change occurs
through interactions between the political branches and the courts; and it endeavors to
explain why and to what extent this process is democratically legitimate." Id at 23.
200 Dworkin, Law's Empire at 14 (cited in note 86).
201 See Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60
Tex L Rev 35, 57 (1981) (arguing that the lawyer's distinctive knowledge lies in his ability to apply the method of "analogy and precedent," which has been dubbed "the artificial
Reason of the law").
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trying, but.often failing, to decide cases according to its constitutional ideals and principles.
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